July, 1934 Vol. XI. No. 3

BERKELEY BAPTIST DIVINITY SCHOOL LIBRARY

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

CONTENTS

	PAGE
WHEN RELIGION BECOMES AN OPIATE. Milton G. Evans	257
PETER CHELČICKÝ, A BAPTIST FORERUNNER OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY. Joseph Novotny	273
THE NON-UNIQUENESS OF RELIGIOUS KNOWING. W. H. Sheldon	282
SOME DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWING. A. Stewart Woodburne	295
THE BAPTIST POSITION. William R. McNutt	303
THE CONSTRAINT OF CHRIST. Morton S. Enslin	315
HISTORICAL TYPES OF METHOD IN THE CURE OF SOULS. John T. McNeill	323
WHAT IS THEISTIC EVOLUTION? Arthur Stevens Phelps	335
THE SWORD OF CHRIST. Stanley I. Stuber	341
BOOK REVIEWS	351
BOOK NOTICES	378
BOOKS RECEIVED	382

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

THE CROZER QUARTERLY is published by the Faculty of Crozer Theological Seminary, with the aid of funds provided by the Trustees. THE QUARTERLY aims to be a journal for the expression of theological opinion, embracing all the interests of students of religion, whether ministers, teachers, or laymen. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed, publication indicating that the editors regard the articles as voicing opinions important enough to command attention.

A. STEWART WOODBURNE, Editor.
RITTENHOUSE NEISSER, Business Manager.

Remittances and business communications should be addressed to

THE BUSINESS MANAGER, THE CROZER QUARTERLY
Crozer Theological Seminary, Chester, Pa.

Editorial communications, contributions and books for review should be sent to

THE EDITOR, THE CROZER QUARTERLY
Crozer Theological Seminary, Chester, Pa.

Subscription, $1.50 the year; single numbers, 40 cents

Printed for the Crozer Theological Seminary by
THE JUDSON PRESS
Philadelphia, Pa.

Entered as second-class matter, December 21, 1923, at the post-office at Chester, Pa., under Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized December 21, 1923.

Copyright, July, 1934, by Crozer Theological Seminary.

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

Vol. XI JULY, 1934 No. 3

WHEN RELIGION BECOMES AN OPIATE

MILTON G. EVANS

Retiring President, Crozer Theological Seminary

In times of social distress a phrase embodying a half truth becomes a gospel for the discontented. It concentrates in a sentence unfulfilled hopes and a longed-for good. It is an indictment of the past and a pledge for the future. It is the more forceful if it is coined by an intellectualist who has mastered the dominant philosophy of his day, who has the gift of literary expression, and who is aroused to fury by social inequalities that can and ought to be remedied. Such was Karl Marx. Knowing the man and his times, it is not strange that his sentence, "Religion is the opiate of the people," should have been accepted as the word of a prophet. So axiomatic sounded the assertion that it required only a few years for a kindred spirit, Lenin, to write:

> Religion is one of the forces of spiritual oppression, lying everywhere on the masses of the people. The helplessness of the exploited classes in their struggle with the exploiters just as inevitably guarantees faith in a better life beyond the grave as the helplessness of the savage in his struggle with nature produces gods, devils, miracles, and so forth.

It is easy for a theistic apologist to point out the fallacy in this conception of religion. It is not so easy to make discontented workers see the fallacy. The assumptions underlying Lenin's pronouncement are as old as the Sophist Critias (died 403 B. C.), who taught that religious beliefs and customs were due to the craft of rulers who, having dis-

covered that they could control outward actions only, invented and imposed upon their subjects belief in supernatural powers, who could discover and punish inward motives and purposes. Both conceive the purpose of religion to be physical comfort and material welfare. Both conceive the origin of religion to be in antagonism between social groupings, though Lenin's theory is more concerned with modern thinking. Both agree in conceiving religion to be a method of control of one group by another. Critias' ruler and Lenin's exploiter are both drugging the ones they wish to exploit. Both agree that supernaturalism is a device, whether of rulers, as Critias states, or of organized religious leadership, as Lenin asserts by implication. They differ, however, in the motive for theorizing. The ancient Greek was a sophisticated rationalist, interested in debate for debate's sake. The modern communist was motivated by an altruistic desire to lift up the oppressed, though it be at the cost of the oppressor. Lenin must be interpreted in the light of his motives and purposes and acts. His indictment of religion must be taken seriously. Is Marx's dictum justified? Is "religion an opiate of the people"? An opiate is not in itself an evil. Modern medicine owes much to opium, if opium be allowed to represent the generic term anesthetic. To say that religion is an opiate of the people is not necessarily to disparage religion, although Marx meant to do so. But before anything can be predicated of religion, religion itself should be defined. And this itself is not easy to do. No clear thinking is possible without agreement on use of terms. The "ambiguous middle" is the pitfall of almost all controversialists.

First, then, the presuppositions of both Critias and Marx may be challenged. To define religion on the basis of rationalization of a ruler's experience with his subjects, or primitive man's experience with nature, is to prejudge the question whether religion is an anesthetic for good or for evil. The difficulty of reaching an agreement for the purpose of stating

the major premise accurately is seen in the fact that historians and psychologists and philosophers have so defined religion as to give laymen a choice of one out of nearly sixty definitions as the only defensible one. The historian's bewilderment is due to the many forms religious life has assumed in human history. They are necessarily concerned with the morphology of religion as represented in organizations, creeds, ritual and conduct. They study bones and flesh and tendons and arteries and the nervous system. They make diagrams of each so-called religion, compare diagrams, and attempt to imitate the naturalist in classifying according to structure. They find, however, a common fact, namely that all religions are based on belief in super-naturalism. That is, spirits other than men and superior to men, in at least one particular, have some effect on their worshipers.

But the historian's conclusion is not accepted by the philosopher, for it does not explain how the belief arises. Prior to animism, which is a rather definite conception, lies a belief that has been termed animatism, which is not religious but philosophic. That is, it is the causal judgment at work in explaining environment, and not the attitude which we describe as religious. This is a summons for the psychologist to bear their testimony. They have eagerly responded. Their answers number almost as many as the emotions and sentiments possible to the mind. Hobbes' revival of the theory of Petronius, that *Primus in orbe deos facit timor,* is acceptable to Lenin, and is his major premise. At any rate, some "complex," if not the fear complex, must be the dominating conception in defining religion. Indeed it may be the "Œdipus complex" of Freud. Whatever the mood of mind that generates the attitude that warrants the descriptive word religious, that word may be evoked by a purely physical phenomenon. To the psychologist the conception of a spirit-world is not necessary to religion. While study of religions historically discloses an object of worship, the study psycho-

logically reveals that other objects than "gods" awaken awe, fear, repulsion, attraction, admiration, and resultant physical behavior. The question is whether states of mind should determine the classification of objects that occasion them. The same mood of mind may be occasioned in a child by father and mother, but this hardly warrants any inference as to the extra-mental relationships of parents. For this reason the purely psychological study of religion cannot take us back to its origin any more than the historical method pursued alone. Since the psychological method is the more subjective and therefore the more capricious, it gives rise to more definitions than the historical, including many forms of theism and the purely non-theistic, not to say atheistic, interpretations of Freud and Jung. Jung lauds the purity and power of Christian morality, but finds no extra-human reason for it. The instinctive impulses and unconscious factors in human nature furnish the dynamic for moral and spiritual progress. All the forces requisite for physical and psychic maladaptation with environment are found in man alone. The negative and restraining forces that found expression in the early Christian movement were not due to divine initiative through Jesus. He is only a mythical figure, an explanation and a symbol of the inherent potentiality of the human to solve the problem of licentiousness and on the principle of brotherly love to make a collective culture possible. The problem, then, narrows to this, Is religion possible without theism? In other words, if a definition of religion must on historical grounds, and I think on psychological grounds also, include the conception of a power other and above with whom man has relations, is this conception an opiate for man individually and in his social relations? To answer this question demands an answer to the question, What is the function of religion? Lenin answered, It is a device, man-made. This was Critias' opinion also. They described religion functionally. They are on the right track. Perhaps, unconsciously, they perceived that

origins are of no great consequence in explaining human history. It is futile to explain Rosa Bonheur's paintings of animals by citing drawings of primitive man on the walls of his cave-dwelling; or to explain the modern tractor by the crooked stick of the primitive plowman; or the present-day machine-gun by the musket of the seventeenth century; or *Paradise Lost* by the first-known attempts to transmit ideas by symbols. Aristotle made an epoch-making contribution to human thinking, when he formally reviewed the history of speculative thinking prior to his time and classified "causes" as material formal, efficient, and final and emphasized the final. His interest was in the organism, since he was a biologist, and he was concerned with development. By the end or final cause, he meant the conscious and deliberate, or instinctive or subconscious purpose which the process of development has realized. The idea of end and the idea of function are inseparable to a biologist, as to any one who conceives his object of study developmentally. The late Professor George B. Foster of the University of Chicago thus conceived religion in his book, *The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence.* The book was of course a child of its times. It was a designed apologetic for religion in an age dominated by the Darwinian theory of struggle and the sociologist's conception of human history as an organism. This at once discloses its strength and its weakness. It has the weakness of every apologetic temporariness; its strength is in showing the continuity of religion in human history, and its function in producing moral excellence.

But to treat religion functionally demands that it be considered experimentally, that is, anthropomorphically. In such treatment "it is self-evident that man can attribute no higher kind of moral ideas to his god or gods than those which he himself possesses, which he himself understands and evaluates . . . the main thing is the kind of spiritual worth the deity or deities stand for." Or, to put it conversely, "In

what other way can you be so sure of what a man would like to be, of what a man would choose as his satisfying portion, as you can by finding out what sort of God he has?" This fact in psychology was recognized by the psalmist: "With the gracious thou wilt show thyself gracious; With an upright man thou wilt show thyself upright; With the pure thou wilt show thyself pure; and with the froward thou wilt show thyself froward" (Ps. 18: 25, 26). But he did not identify an "idea of God" with God. It is with the idea of God or gods held in human experience that makes a functional treatment possible and necessary. Now, the question is not whether religion is an opiate of the people, but whether an idea of God is an opiate. This raises the question, What is the true end of man? What is his goal or destiny? Is it to glorify God and enjoy him forever? If so, Who or What is God that he is worthy of human glorification? What experience do we expect when we shall enjoy him? Will this experience be so satisfying that we shall not wish for its termination? In other words, is God a means or an end? Is he an instrument to satisfy human desires, an ideal constructed for the purpose of constructing successive ideals, each instrumental in the progress of the race? Is this all that can be said of religion? If so, then at any given stage of development, it may lie like a heavy incubus on humanity. For the ideal takes many forms. They are the various ways in which we figure to ourselves the outreaching and ever-expanding values of our concrete acts. But concrete acts are as multiform as the numberless situations in which men find themselves. The outreaching and the ever-expanding may be for food, for drink, for property, for conquest, for ease, for satisfaction of any appetite or impulse stimulated by concrete situations. Hence, ideals of every sort may have the term religious applied to them, if gods be conceived as instrumental in achieving them. Inevitably, there is a comparison of ideals, comparison of good to be experienced, comparison of the

instrumental "gods." In course of time the epithets false and true came to be applied to gods and to religions and to ideals, but ideas of God and religion and ideals remain. As instruments they have failed; as ends they persist. And the reason is that gods conceived as instruments belong to the childhood and youth of religious experience, but God conceived as the ultimate truth and beauty and goodness is the experience of the religious adult. The adult refuses to use God as an African savage uses his fetish, or a Tibetan priest his prayer-wheel, or an enlightened American his creed or his church.

The idea of a "god" is correlate of the idea of a "good," and the idea "good" rises from an experience that is not good, or, positively stated, an evil. Since man experiences both good and evil, and knows that these come whether he desires them or not, he conceives some power other than self and superior to self to be the cause of them. With this superior power he attempts to come into such relationships as secure the good and escape the evil. Variety of experience of good gives rise to variety of spirits (gods), good and evil, there may be as many spirits as experiences; hence, the name functional deities, as among the early Indo-Aryans and characteristic of Roman religions prior to the introduction of the Greek pantheon. In every religion is the effort to adjust self to the deity immediately invoked, in order to satisfy desire for present and future welfare. When the adjustment is satisfactorily made, an experience called salvation is enjoyed. The definite idea conveyed by the word salvation depends on the evil escaped and the correlative good attained; for example, from sickness to health, from danger to safety, from poverty to possessions, from weakness to strength, from slavery to freedom, from disquiet of mind to peace, from death to life. Thus it is that in every religion there is some doctrine of the end to be gained. This doctrine always rests upon a more or less pessimistic view of the world.

Since the end sought is the negation of ills, the worst evil is variously conceived. And the worst evils are normally in human experience at certain levels, physical: hunger, thirst, excessive cold, excessive heat, dangers from animal and human foe. Perpetuation of physical existence is the instinctive urge of the will to live. But nothing is known of man's social organization before the tribal stage, and in this stage spirits have acquired names, and have been selected as tribal deities. So that to belong to a tribe is to belong to a "god." The god is a tribal possession and is symbol of tribal solidarity. So that a "god" is distinguished from a "spirit" by having a name and by having a social function of protecting the group as a social unit. However, in the pre-tribal period, man said "Thou" to the spirit that resided in his fetish, and thought of it as his own private possession aiding him in his struggle for existence. He, too, had his sense of attraction and repulsion, of love and of hate. His endowed individuality that made him different from others and his feeling of kinship with his spirit were carried over into the tribe. There was rivalry of interest, that of his fetish-spirit with that of his tribal god, and that of his individual welfare as over against that of the social unit of which he is now a part. Multiply this individual by the number composing any tribe, and the number of clashing interests can be imagined. Tribal organization itself was effected under pressure. Preservation and perpetuation of the tribe demanded regulations, modes of behavior for the common good. The common good became the foe of the individual's good. The god of the social unit became a foe of the fetish. The fetish worshiper was suspected, for he was carrying around a secret spirit. The magician in the spirit-stage of religion was a man of power, feared, honored, bribed, cajoled, to meet the needs of the less gifted. When his aid is sought in the god-stage, or tribal stage, against the social unit, he is tabu, an outlaw. He is antisocial. Group interests prevail at the expense of

individual interests. New social bonds are forged. New experiences create and make permanent new ideals. Egoistic and altruistic impulses come into conflict. They work at cross purposes. There is need for orderliness. Some sort of adjustments must be made. The adjustment proves satisfactory. Tribal security is maintained; the disloyal are banned. The "god" triumphs over fetish. The "god" is worshiped; he is made creator and guardian of social order; he is the giver of the law to the tribe; while in fact all the while the social unit was autonomous. That is, moral requirements were intra-tribal, just because there had been human traits of kindness, sympathy, courage, devotion, loyalty in family before families coalesced into tribes. Experience soon showed that overt acts of misconduct were not sufficient criteria of states of mind. Conduct must be judged according to the disposition of the doer. The desire, the father of the deed, is culpable. The one that harbors hate in the heart is murderer. This is the essence of human nature. Holiness, love, kindness, faithfulness, hate, jealousy, courteousness are human traits recognized by ignorant African Negroes yet in the grip of fetish belief. Nassau, in his *Fetishism in West Africa,*[1] tells of a slave-girl of a tribal chieftain, who was accused and convicted of murdering the chief's mother. She was condemned to be drowned. The missionary protested to the chief that the girl was innocent, for he knew that she was accused of witchcraft. The chief replied that the girl had confessed. The missionary asked the privilege of seeing the girl, which was granted. The girl described how she had become angry at the petulance of her mistress, and wished for her death; had collected crumbs of her food, strands of her hair, and shreds of her clothing, and had mixed these with other things; had tied them all together on a stick which she had secretly buried at the threshold of the door of her mistress. The African slave-girl had the Sermon on the Mount in her

[1] Robert Hamill Nassau, *Fetishism in West Africa.* Pp. 130ff.

nature. As there would have been no Varuna, if there had been no over-arching sky; no Neptune, if there had been no sea; no Agni, if there had been no fire; no Aurora, if there had been no dawn; no Indra, if there had been no storm-cloud; no Vishnu, if there had been no protector; no Siva, if there had been no ugliness and hate and beastliness; no Brahma, if there had been no prayer; no Kubera, if there had been no wealth; no Venus, if there had been no love; no Minerva, if there had been no wisdom; no Zeus, if there had been no ruler high and mighty and supreme; so there would have been no Father in heaven, if there had been no father on earth. Man is religious from his very nature. It is the life in him that under given conditions produces polytheism, henotheism, monotheism. It is the social-life impulse within that for self-protective purposes produces creeds and rituals and organization. In itself the mute, outstretched arms of an Indian imploring the Great Spirit is prayer as sincere and as answerable as the " Purge me with hyssop and I shall be clean " of a devout Hebrew. Religion exists in its own right as an idealizing function of human nature, as art and science and morality have a guarantee of their own in the human constitution.

It is this idealizing power of man that has produced what we call civilization. It has created language, abstract thinking, poetry, music, architecture, science, modern industry. It has founded and overturned empires; and established the three great faiths that are now contending for the final allegiance of the human soul. It is this power of projecting the self-of-today into the self-of-tomorrow that makes it impossible to talk about the finality of any religion. For no human has the right in the name of the potential values of man to set limits short of that supreme and all-comprehending ideal value we call God.

Just here is the paradoxical fact in human nature. Josiah Royce called attention to the fact that self-hood is, by its

very nature, projective. The empirical self is no self at all. It judges itself not by the past nor by the present, but by the future; and this for the reason that the self is social and the judgment is not mine in isolation but mine as a *socius,* a companion. William James expresses it: "When for motives of honor and conscience I brave the condemnation of my own family, club and 'set'; when as a Protestant, I turn Catholic; as a Catholic, a free-thinker; as a regular practitioner, homeopath, or what not, I am always inwardly strengthened in my course and steeled against the loss of my actual social self by the thought of the other and better possible social judges than those whose verdict goes against me now. The ideal social self which I thus seek in appealing to their decision may be very remote; it may be represented as barely possible. I may not hope for its realization during my lifetime; I may even expect the future generations, which would approve me if they knew me, to know nothing about me when I am dead and gone. Yet still the emotion that beckons me on is indubitably the pursuit of an ideal social self that is at least *worthy* of approving recognition by the highest *possible* judging companion, if such companion there be. This self is the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the permanent Me which I seek. This judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the 'Great Companion.'"[2] In the same connection he adds: "The impulse to pray is a necessary consequence of the fact that while the innermost of the empirical selves of a man is a self of a *social* sort, it can yet find its only adequate *Socius* in an ideal world." But prayer is the heart of religion. And what we pray for is the test of what we feel our need to be. On the level to which Professor James has lifted us, our need is deliverance from an empirical self to that of a self that can glorify the "Great Companion" and enjoy him forever. At least two levels of religious experience are portrayed by the psalmist.

[2] *Psychology,* Vol. I, pp. 375ff. Quoted by Foster in *Function of Religion,* pp. 100f.

And as for me, my feet almost turned aside,
My steps well nigh slid,
For I was envious at the foolish,
When I saw the prosperity of the wicked.

. . . . . .

A beast I have been before thee.
But I am continually with thee;
Thou hast kept hold of my right hand,
Thou wilt guide me by thy counsel,
And afterwards wilt receive me to glory.
Whom have I in Heaven?
And with thee I have no delight on the earth.
My strength and my heart fail;
The rock of my heart and my portion is God
forevermore.

Religion, using the word now morphologically, is increasingly a factor in every level of human ascent. History discloses a mechanism somewhat like an escalator. An invisible power operates the ever-rising stairs upon which every generation steps, and the lowest step for the first generation was just a step above the level of the animal. His needs were primarily physical. On this level, from which he steps, not in a moment, but in a millennium, his god is the god of the contemporaries of Jeremiah—the god of physical comfort. "But we will certainly carry out every word that is gone forth out of our mouth, to burn incense to the queen of heaven, and to pour out to her drink offerings, as we have done, we and our fathers, our kings and our princes, in the cities of Judah and in the streets of Jerusalem; for then we had plenty of food and were prosperous, and suffered no harm." On this level are the elements that go to make up a common culture. Every possible idea of achievement in industry, in art, in literature, in science, and in philosophy are contemporary interests. There is always present an interpreter, a prophet, in the religious sense. In fact, there are always two or more. They give rival interpretations of contem-

porary facts. They are all prophets speaking in the name of God. The people are "incurably religious," to use Sabatier's well-known phrase. What prophet, i. e., what idea of God will they accept? On the low level, the god "that satisfieth the mouth with good things." But the escalator is on the move. There are contemporaries who see the next step appearing, they will be lifted, and a few more are on the higher level, and during centuries they work out a civilization on that plane. The process has been repeated until we are now in the world culture we approve or disapprove. The escalator has been carrying upward in time and space representatives of all the god-ideas of the past. We can hear them talk the language of the worshipers of the queen of heaven in Philadelphia, not only in the slums but in our aristocratic clubs. The god of economics is invoked as the Saviour of the world, as well as of the Republican or Democratic party. Interpreters of religion pour out incense to the god of capital and to the god of labor, as they sanctified war against "The Huns" in the name of Christ. In the name of religion the Eighteenth Amendment was put into the Constitution. In the name of religion it has been stricken out. Is it any wonder the citizens of Jerusalem could not know whether Jeremiah or Hananiah was the true prophet? The future alone revealed. Some of us know Jeremiah was prophet of Jehovah, the God of the moral ideal, not the national. But all do not, because modern religion is as morphological as in the days of Hananiah. The social order of today has vestigial remains of every stage of religious development from primitive animism to moral monotheism. It is these vestigial organs, once functionally advantageous, that are now the sources of disease. Nor can they be removed by surgical operations, as easily as surgeons cut away functionless organs. History shows that in all religions the motives for belief and practice are both egoistic and altruistic. That is, all men have always striven to escape from present

and future ills; many have always wished to promote social welfare by self-surrender for the good of others; many, but not so many, have striven to attain an ideal character. All ethical, or founded, or so-called book religions appeal to all these motives, but the emphasis varies in each; nor has the same motive equal power in all. The human soil in which ideals take root is too diverse in depth, in friability, and in cleanliness.

We who have been lifted up the "great stairs of time" can look back and down the incline, and discover that it has been no accident that the worshipers of nature deities in Indo-Arya have in India produced an impersonal Brahman and an emotionless Buddha, while the worshipers of El-Shaddai in Mesopotamia illustrated in the migration of Abraham, have produced a Jesus of Nazareth. The reason is, that in India the gods were too closely allied with nature and nature's processes. They were not closely enough connected with man and history. Their literature is not theology but mythology; their narratives are Puranas, stories about gods, not folk-tales, stories about Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses and David; their hymns are addressed to forces within nature, not psalms addressed to a God above nature and working within the human for human redemption. Non-personal, that is, non-moral religions have been an opiate of the people. Witness India.

But in Israel, Jehovah is a God of moral order, of moral distinctions. He partakes of the character of the moral imperative. Such a god is a jealous God. He tolerates no rival for his affections. He will bruise and break and destroy, in order to make his moral ideal a fact in human experience. It became a fact. At last one man learned it and gave voice that has not been silenced since. "It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learn thy statutes." "Whom the Lord loves he chastens." At last within Israel it became a conviction that physical good and moral good

have necessarily no relation. They were so disparate as "goods," that it became a joy to suffer for righteousness' sake, and the kind of righteousness was illustrated in Jesus, an Israelite in whom there was no guile. Interpreting evil in the light of Jesus, another Israelite learned that his worst evil was not lack of food or shelter, not suffering shipwreck and starvation, not scorn and contempt, but his impotency to do what is right. To a Christian of the Pauline ideal the worst evil is moral helplessness. Salvation is the power to reach toward his goal of moral perfection with hope of reaching it through Christ. Such religion is not an opiate, neither for self nor for others.

Why has Israel become the world's tutor in righteousness? The object of worship is the answer. Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? He that hath clean hands and a pure heart; who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity. And the "gods" of physical comforts and economic success and political world powers are vanities. The only religion that has been the opiate of any one is that conception of religion that puts to sleep by affirming ideals lower than the highest, satisfactions on the level of the here and now. A religion that offers the highest theoretically, but in order to conserve its organized historical forms, transfers loyalty from the Moral Will who creates organs to function redemptively, to the organ of preservation known to be diseased, is likewise an opiate of the people. So far Karl Marx was right. The Roman Catholic Church of the eighteenth century in France was not religion; hence the French Revolution. The Russian Orthodox Church was not religion in the twentieth century; hence Lenin's revolution and the Soviet Republic. *Organized* Protestantism is not religion anywhere; hence, its disintegration in polity, in doctrine and in morals. But functional organs of religion cannot put people to sleep permanently. No organized form of ritual, nor of creed, nor of propaganda can. For a God who is Moral Will,

creative and controlling and redeeming, has effected a conscience in human society, that finds personal expression in men of divine discontent that will not allow them or the world in which they live to sleep. Jesus, just because of what he was as the revealer of such a God—and because of what he promises to be as Saviour from sin—the Lord's Messiah, to those who follow him, is the final conclusive denial that religion is an opiate, except the opiate that puts to sleep, or better puts to death the pessimism that holds that moral achievements are impossible. In Christ all things are possible, the possibility that Christianity will effect God's redemptive purposes in men and for man, even if the historical creeds and rituals and organizations perish. Religion survived the overthrow of temple and altar and priesthood and kingdom. It will do so again. The highest conceivable religion is to love God with heart and mind and strength and to love neighbor as self. In Jesus self and God coalesced, so to speak. In him Theism and Humanism find their human illustration. The "I" and the "Thou" are one and inseparable, yet always "I" and "Thou." Since his day no Christian conscience can sleep until that experience shall be true of all men. Religion misinterpreted is an opiate. The religion of Jesus as a fact in human experience is a stimulant.

PETER CHELČICKÝ, A BAPTIST FORERUNNER OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

JOSEPH NOVOTNY

Professor, International Baptist Seminary, East Orange, N. J.

HISTORIANS agree that the contribution of the Baptists to the better understanding of the New Testament consists of this great triad: freedom of conscience, separation of the church from the state, and baptism. An outstanding figure of the Reformation who is not known enough now and who was a full-blooded Baptist on the first two counts at least, was Peter Chelčický (pronounced Khalchetzke), whom the Czechoslovak Baptists rightfully claim as their own.

The list of witnesses who through the centuries have demanded the right of the freedom of conscience, protested against the union of the church and state, and proclaimed the proper use of the New Testament baptism cannot be complete without the country of the "book and cup," Czechoslovakia, and the "Unitas Fratrum," the "most beautiful blossom on the tree of Christianity," which is the cradle of the church of the Moravian Brethren. While the writings of some of the leaders of "Unitas Fratrum" are not quite clear on the question of baptism (because the Brethren were bitterly persecuted and therefore tried to mislead their enemies) it is nevertheless a historical fact that this "Unitas Fratrum" practiced believer's immersion for about one hundred years, and emphasized very strongly the freedom of conscience and separation of church and state.

The spiritual father of the old "Unitas Fratrum" was Peter Chelčický. History tells very little about Chelčický's life, since the only sources are his writings, and in these he does not write much about himself because of his modesty. We know only that he was born about 1390 in the south of Bohemia not far from the birthplace of John

Hus and John Žižka, the military leader of the Husites. He was a peasant without academic education, but was an original thinker, and one of the greatest philosophers of his time. He himself admits that he knew very little Latin, and it is very probable that he never left his birthplace, Chelčice, even as another great philosopher Kant never left Königsberg. The rest of our discussion must be confined to the philosophy of this great man, as that is portrayed by his writings.

In fact, Chelčický is important chiefly because of what he wrote. Of the many books, booklets and tracts that came from his pen, two are of particular interest, *The Postilla* (Sermons) and *The Net of the True Faith.* Baptist folks especially will enjoy these two books, for in them are well represented the three pillars of the Baptist message. Chelčický was against all violence (as a matter of fact he was an apostle of pacifism), he was the author of the separation of church and state, and he believed that the immersion of believers is the ideal of New Testament Christianity.

Chelčický lived at the time when Žižka defended the Husite faith by means of arms, and although the whole nation backed Žižka, Chelčický opposed him because of his views. Says Chelčický: "God did not revoke his commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill.' We have, therefore, no right to make any exceptions. The words and example of Christ compel us to love our enemy and not to hate him. Do not obey the enemy of the Divine Truth, but on the other hand, do not use physical force to combat against his assaults." This view was held by Chelčický through his whole life. He always opposed war and capital punishment.

In his book, *The Net of the True Faith,* Chelčický says literally that the Christian church suffered its greatest blow when at the time of the Emperor Constantine the church began to be connected with the state. "Thus poison was poured into the body of the church," says he. The whole book is

a most excellent argument for the separation of the church and state.

On the subject of baptism he is not very clear. He rejects baptism of people who do not believe but nevertheless debates within himself to find the correct interpretation of the New Testament on this topic. One of his sentences shows, however, that there were times when his love for New Testament principles won out. "Only grown-up believers ought to be baptized," are his own words.

Chelčický's whole philosophy of life is a logical system. His ideal is that of the apostles. He does not wish to have anything to do with the state. The state is only a negative influence. It punishes the criminal but does not try to make him better. The peasant has the best occupation, for he has the fewest temptations. Business is very dangerous because there the temptation to deceive is very strong. It is better to live in the country than in the city, for in the city it is very difficult to keep from being worldly. The church (Catholic) is so bad that it is impossible to reform it. The Christian should be concerned not with teaching, but with living a decent life; not with discussions about faith, but with the realization of the gospel in life. The priests have no right to add to the law of God. The pope is the first and chief anti-Christ and the priests are his apostles. A good Christian is happy when he suffers for Christ. The first Christians suffered from the heathen; today Christians suffer because of the false church. The Christian should never use force, not even for the sake of his faith!

Chelčický's style is very picturesque. He attacks the abuses of the church without any reservations:

> The priests compel the people to fast and they say that it is a great sin to eat meat on Friday, but they are not ashamed to quarrel and discredit their neighbors the whole fasting day! The Word of God has been replaced by human nonsense. The Gospel says nothing about purgatory and mass for the dead. "Thy faith will cure thee." *Thine* own;

not the faith of somebody else. They praise the New Testament but actually their only Testament is what they do.

The council in Basel dared to say that even though the Lord's Supper under both kinds came from Christ himself, the church has the right to change it! And whosoever tries to think differently is called a heretic and sectarian.

Today there are very few sins in existence; they have been changed into virtues. However, if somebody has a sin, he goes to the pope, who will forgive him. If he cannot go there, he can find some drunken priest who will ask his purse to repent.

The Lord Jesus very modestly rode on an ass, but the pope rides a big white horse covered with gold, in sinful luxury surrounded by nobility. This is truly the anti-Christ who opposes Christ with his pride. God made himself modest, but the pope, a sinful man claims to be the successor to Christ. Only blind people can honor him as God. In the church, the priests praise the martyrs, but at home he goes in the footsteps of the rich man described in the Gospel. Many a priest is not fit to look after cattle; how then can he look after the souls that the Lord Jesus saved by his blood?

Scarcely could there be found a more distinct and original personality in the history of the Reformation than Chelčický. He refused foggy ideas; he liked definite views. His Christianity was straight-lined, aggressive, ruggedly clear, and knew no compromises, even though he lived at the time when such writings as he published might lead to serious consequences. From this standpoint Chelčický is very similar to Luther. Surely Chelčický interests the modern reader; how much more must his contemporaries have enjoyed his writings!

Chelčický's "discoveries" were absolutely original. None of his contemporaries are like him in this respect. Historians differ as to the originality of Hus; some of them go as far as to say that he leaned quite a bit on Wyclif. Not so with Chelčický, however. In fact, his message came at a most unfavorable and unsuitable time for his country. Let us consider the situation: The people in his land (Bohemia) were at war—the most popular war the land ever had—a war of defense; the defense of the most precious treasure, religion,

and Chelčický dared to call the heroes of the most famous period of that country, "murderers." Yet, the Husites put up with him. They did not imprison him or confiscate his writings, as would do any nation today under similar circumstances. This is another illustration of how a strong religious life of a country will bring the people to a high level.

Faith is a gift of God, but even this gift comes through human channels. Therefore we cannot help asking questions. How did these remarkable views originate? What kind of character was Chelčický, and what were his surroundings which evidently influenced his philosophy of life?

As was stated, the study of Chelčický's life is very difficult because there are practically no historical resources. In fact, they are poorer than those of any of his contemporaries. The only resources we have are his books and the writings of his followers and adversaries, and even the latter, while they tell how strongly Chelčický influenced them, seldom say anything about the man himself.

Nevertheless, a very careful student can find in Chelčický's character one distinct feature which is one of the causes of his views. It is his inclination to use paradox. Chelčický surely did not belong to that group of people who never get above the certainties of the evident facts of life. Such people remain contented with half-truths; they explain at length facts which you grasp in a moment; they "discover" views which others have had for a long time. They try to prove that sugar is white and grass is green; that John Hus was good and Judas was bad. This group has not given the world a single genius, reformer, discoverer. Without success Chesterton tries in his inimitable style to promote this group to a level it can never reach.

Chelčický belonged to the very antipode of this group. He belonged to the daring lovers of paradox. This group loves forgotten, unknown, unappreciated truths. From this group are recruited the greatest souls of the world. One

of the outstanding figures of this group in modern times is Nietzsche. He really wanted something great and unusually different from what his contemporaries wanted. It is the tragedy of his life that he gave to his "superman" a character so fundamentally different from that which his intimate friend under the influence of the same motive, Richard Wagner, would give to his ideal man.

Like Nietzsche, Chelčický was armed with this ability to use paradox, and was thus well prepared for his life's work. When everybody was saying "A," he was emphasizing "B" and his paradox was strengthened further by his more than average self-confidence. His adversaries were continually criticizing his self-confidence and his paradox. They mention both frequently, but Chelčický answers by using them incessantly: "And whosoever tries to think differently is called a heretic and sectarian by the priests." The reader of Chelčický's writings will find that he acknowledged these two characteristics again and again and that he suffered isolation because of them. He says too, however, that he did not mind his seclusion.

In one instance he went even as far as to seemingly change his point of view for the cause. But this is only apparent. It has been said that Chelčický was opposed to the Husite war, but fifteen years later when the Husites wanted reconciliation with Rome, this same Chelčický at once becomes a fighter on the spiritual battle-ground. While the most stedfast Husite leaders gave up and were ready to compromise with the enemy, Chelčický, again isolated, was proclaiming spiritual war against the adversary. Surely Chelčický was not a reed which bent with the wind.

Chelčický's lack of education may be considered his advantage when we realize that the schools in his time did not create many productive talents. It was the golden age of discipleship. Students learned chiefly by rote. It is doubtful if Chelčický would have come to his far-reaching conclusions

if he had entered the university where the professors would have filled him with their views. The university would have had a cooling effect upon his feverish thoughts which daringly attacked the current opinion of that age. Kant assures us that a very good memory is often a hindrance to the thinker, as the collected thoughts of others are likely to be in the way when he tries to do some original thinking. The person with the good memory finds it impossible sometimes to distinguish between his own thoughts and the thoughts he acquired from others. As a rule, a good memory is considered to be the sign of a superior mind, but this is a mistake. The person with the good memory is sometimes not of the highest intellectual type. Seldom it is that the proprietor of an infallible memory turns out to be a genius in producing original thinking.

Chelčický's time was a period when a good memory was worshiped. His unique original productions were spared the influence of inferior commentaries on the Bible, with which the professors in the university at that time filled the minds of their students. Had Chelčický studied at the university he would scarcely have given us the books which still live after five hundred years. His enemies criticized him because of his lack of schooling, but his friends protected him: "Although he was not master of the seven arts, he nevertheless fulfilled the eight beatitudes and therefore was actually a full-fledged doctor."

Furthermore, the environment in which Chelčický grew intensified the precious talents which he possessed. The seclusion of the village saved him from the dangers of a big city where intellectual concentration was very difficult. It is very probable that had Chelčický been in the midst of the Husite movement in Prague, he would have spent his energy in agitating activity, speaking and organizing. He would scarcely have had time and opportunity to give to the world the threefold program which he conserved in his writings.

In this seclusion with the pressure from his enemies he

was able to develop other positive qualities. Chelčický's enemies created within him counter-pressure. He never gave up; he never retrenched. His hard, stubborn character could never quit, and his stedfastness was his and our fortune. His enemies reproached him for his stubbornness, but he used masterful reproach. "God never withdrew his commandments, 'Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not covet,' and since these laws still hold, do the priests and masters (of arts) deceive us when they excuse such sins?"

Chelčický, according to his three chief views was a Baptist forerunner. His ideas about baptism satisfy the Baptists. His views on the separation of church and state were in accord with the ideals of Baptist leaders everywhere. (The Baptists have always fought for this ideal, even in Czechoslovakia before the great World War when they suffered persecution because of their views.) He was a pacifist as is every loyal Baptist. In fact, the Baptists, although they were always bitterly persecuted, claim the honor of never in any instance using force to spread or defend their views; and the Baptists are the only Protestant denomination that can say that. Chelčický therefore belongs to the Baptists.

Thus, the Czechoslovak Baptists, having their own natural Baptist tradition, can produce their own Baptist culture and typical Baptist ideal. It is not wise to transplant any one form of Christianity from one country to another and in the case of the Czechoslovaks, it is not necessary. Czechoslovaks can learn from other Baptists of the world, but at the same time can contribute toward the common Baptist ideal. The fact that the Baptist ideals are rooted somewhat in the national history of Czechoslovakia makes it easier for any Baptist body to promote its evangelistic effort there.

Chelčický was born too early for his times, for his views have not been appreciated until recently. Tolstoy himself professes willingly that he is Chelčický's humble disciple, for Chelčický is a great teacher. Professor Jastrebow of Petro-

grad University, who recently died in Prague, is the greatest authority on Chelčický's life and teachings. The famous German contemporary historian, Karl Vogel, recently translated into German both of Chelčický's standard books: *The Net of True Faith* and *The Postilla,* and assures us that Chelčický was a much greater religious genius than Luther and surely more original than the great German reformer. It is no wonder, then, that the Czechoslovak Baptists consider Peter Chelčický their great forerunner and have used his name in the name of their union.

May the words of the greatest living Czechoslovak, President T. G. Masaryk, be the closing thought:

> During the reformation we produced several great characters: Žižka was the first, and Comenius, the great educator, was the second. But should Žižka be our only ideal today? Shall everyone of us be a Žižka? As I study history and meditate on the spirit of the great Czechoslovaks, do I wish to be a Žižka? Do I want to be a Comenius? Sword, book? No! What shall I be? I want to be a Chelčický. Chelčický is different from Žižka or Comenius; he does not wish to use force. I do not want military offence, but love; love that comes not because of weakness, but the kind of love that inspires the firmness, clearness and manhood of Chelčický. I think, therefore, that we have in our history the man whose character we ought to crave. Czechoslovak humanity means the synthesis of Žižka and Comenius in some modern Chelčický. This is the Czechoslovak ideal!

THE NON-UNIQUENESS OF RELIGIOUS KNOWING [1]

Professor W. H. SHELDON
Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

If there is religious knowing, there must be an object that is known; and conversely, if we can show that there is such an object, there is, just so far as we show this, religious knowing. Knowledge is not knowledge without a correlative reality. Then the first question to take up is: Have we sound evidence that there is a real object which man, so far as he is religious, knows?

Now if there is a real object peculiar to religion, this object is a principle or being possessing in supreme degree the highest goods that we are able to conceive. For if there is no such object, religion loses its integrity; the specific quality of confidence and devotion which has characterized religious people has no objective ground, and religion dissolves into a baseless ethics, or a hopeful but somewhat uncertain sociology. The religious man then becomes a social scientist laboring for human progress, or perhaps a poet extolling in persuasive figures the beauty of human ideals; but he lacks that conviction based on the assurance of a Divine Being which even the most resolute will needs to sustain it in times of defeat. The message of religion to mankind is that there is a Divine Being; without that Being, religion deserves no separate name.

Religious knowing is then the knowing of the Deity, his being and to some degree at least his attributes. Is there good evidence that God, as here defined, exists? Now evidence is of two kinds, and two kinds only, viz., observation and inference. As far as we can see, there are no other grounds of belief in heaven or on earth (grounds not causes, for

[1] A paper read at a meeting of the American Theological Society.

emotion is a cause but not a ground). Common knowledge of the trees, rocks, and houses around us employs these two; religious faith either is based on them or is a subjective will-to-believe and not knowledge at all. Sometimes we use one kind much more than the other, though perhaps there is never observation without some degree of interpretation or inference. The observation of a loud noise, as yet scarcely analyzed, contains little inference; the identification of a murderer by circumstantial evidence contains no observation of his criminal act. But most cases of ordinary knowledge rest on both the above grounds. And the same is true of the physical sciences. In history and psychology observation is not so easy. In history the object—a past event—is never directly observed; hence inference plays the chief part. That is perhaps why history becomes more uncertain as we learn more about it. In psychology the difficulty of observation is notorious, and has driven those who wish to make it a science at any cost to a materialistic view. But always the ideal of knowledge is this: to observe the fact directly, as by the eye or by clear introspection, and to confirm the observation by showing that it agrees with what is implied by other facts. As a man walks on two legs, knowledge moves on these two supports. Neither one, however strong it is in its own kind, is quite sufficient without the other. Direct observation, whether of material things or of any other things, is always open to the doubt of illusion. We are often deceived in matters of sense; the mirage in the desert, the large moon on the horizon, are familiar examples. We have to correct these by the test of coherence with the great body of acknowledged physical fact. So, too, the alleged revelations of the divine will must be submitted to tests: do they fit the acknowledged principles of moral conduct and are they contradictory to any facts which we cannot but believe? Mere reasoning on the other hand is even more plainly liable to error; the physicist is never content with an hypothesis, however well

supported by implication, unless it be susceptible of experimental verification. A jury does not like to convict anyone upon circumstantial evidence without the testimony of direct witnesses. Reasoning is believing something to be true because something else is true, and precisely this fact that it is something else gives reasoning a suspicion of uncertainty. Thus each leg needs the other to support the body of knowledge.

The method of procedure then, in any knowledge whatsoever, is simply this. From any cause you please, the question arises, is so and so a fact? Usually the cause is that we want so and so to be a fact; and there is no harm in wanting it, so long as we do not let our judgment be decided by the mere wish. In fact, it is better that our wishes be regarded; apart from them it is doubtful whether we should ever try to discover more than is directly given to observation. Thus the wish gives rise to an hypothesis. But the decision as to the truth of the hypothesis is made by two things: (1) Are the objects alleged in the hypothesis confirmed by observation, and (2) is the hypothesis coherent with other already admitted facts? Do these facts point to or imply the hypothesis in question? If either of these two grounds of decision is forthcoming, the hypothesis is so far probable. If both are forthcoming, the hypothesis approximates or reaches certainty. And so far as we can see, these are the only ways of attaining knowledge. From the investigation of detectives into the identity of a criminal to the highest reaches of religious faith, there is no other sort of evidence than this: we frame an hypothesis, set forth its coherence with known facts, and verify it by direct observation. And the question of religious knowing is simply the question whether or not there is direct confirmation and rational implication of the being of God.

Of course the hypothesis of the Supreme Being involves a terrific leap out of the world of physical facts; but let us

not forget that in this as in any other matter we have a right to form any hypothesis we please. There is no ban upon the formation of hypotheses; in fact, progress often has been made—as the history of science and peculiarly of mathematics has shown—by the formation of hypotheses that seem at first to be in conflict with plain sense. Thus were discovered non-Euclidean geometry and the modern theory of relativity. Thus also men have been led by some supersensuous desire, and contrary to the claims of flesh and blood, to formulate the hypothesis of a perfect being, all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-benevolent. But again, the only question is: is the hypothesis verified in our experience and do the implications of known facts point to it? To these questions we now address ourselves.

Let us first go to the matter of direct observation as the weightier of the two methods. And here the sceptic is ready with a flat denial: there is no direct witness of such a being as we have conceived. And so far as sense-observation is concerned, he is correct. No man has at any time seen God, and here the sceptic speaks with the voice of the normal sense-bred man, for the natural man believes what he sees. But since by the hypothesis that God is a spiritual being without body, God could not be seen, the denial is irrelevant. The question then arises, has anyone had experience of a divine spiritual being? And at once we think of the long array of mystics. They constitute a series of independent witnesses who testify to an overwhelming and immediate awareness of the presence of such a being, mighty and benevolent in the highest degree. True, they differ much in their accounts; these we should expect to be colored by the individual's training and so on; but there is a fairly clear precipitate of the many varying testimonies in favor of some such being as above described.

We have here a genuine instance of first-hand observation. Nevertheless the sceptical critic finds the mystical testi-

mony without weight because the object of the mystic's observation cannot be presented to other men for their verification. The physical scientist makes an experiment and observes the result; he summons others to witness what occurs, and therein lies the proof of his claim. The proof lies in social confirmation; but social confirmation is not open to the mystic. By the latter's own confession, his experience is essentially personal and private. Therefore, concludes the critic, the mystic can offer no proof.

But in the first place this is bad logic. It confuses proof with persuasion. If you wish to persuade another man that so and so is a fact, you get him to see it with his own eyes and then he is convinced. But you, if you have had a clear vision, are not more convinced after he has seen it than you were before. You are only more satisfied, because you have got recognition for what you cannot help but believe to be true. For you the proof lies in the direct observation which you yourself make; if you had not had the observation, you would not have believed. The proof of $6 + 7 = 13$ does not lie in social confirmation but in the necessity that is revealed by counting. All theories of the social nature of truth rest on this confusion of proof with persuasion. And also they forget that there would be no persuasion unless the other man saw directly with his own individual eyes. And in the second place, the sceptic misrepresents the facts. The mystic, like the physicist, makes an experiment. He reasons that a spiritual being can be envisaged only by the mind's eye; the body's eye could not reveal such a being. As the body's eye could not see the Brownian movements in a gas or liquid without the specially contrived assistance of the microscope, so the mind's eye could not perceive the lineaments of Deity without a high degree of technical training. This training constitutes his experiment; and it is a training and an experiment that the hostile critic has not accomplished and is usually unwilling to attempt. It consists of an intense desire for the

truth, with a suppression of all prejudice in favor of sense-perception, and of all bodily or other personal desires but the desire to know the object which he has preconceived as an hypothesis. He would rather have knowledge of this object than have anything else life has to offer. To this striving comes at length a vivid awareness of a being who, presenting no sense-data, yet affects the beholder with a new and hitherto quite undreamed-of experience—an experience of intensest bliss and peace. The experience he must describe as objective, since it is fuller and richer than any he has imagined and has all and more than all the compulsion of a sense-impression. There is revealed in it a value higher than any value he has hitherto felt and more compelling upon belief and action than any other value; and such compulsion is what we mean by existence in the objective sense. From now on he believes in God; and in the face of a certain compelling power, he is unable to raise a doubt. Autosuggestion he cannot admit; it would be as reasonable to call his belief in sense-percepts autosuggestion. In both cases he believes because the experience reveals to him qualities and relations which obviously he could not have conjured up. This is the experiment of the mystic; and it is as genuine an experiment as any performed by the physicist. The mystic, like the latter, claims only that when the experimental conditions are rigorously fulfilled, the result is observed. True enough, the results cannot be public, for the public have not performed the experiment. The difference between mystic and scientist is not one of scientific method, or proof, but is rather in respect of the publicity of results. Personal verification must be made by each individual for himself. But many, very many, have performed the experiment, and have verified the result. Let us suppose that one hundred men had traveled to a certain region in the center of Africa, or in the Antarctic Continent, and had brought back reports of what they had seen, contradicting no known laws of nature, and with minor

discrepancies, but agreeing in the main. Let them be solitary travelers working independently, undergoing the rigorous training and enduring the hardships incident to the unusual conditions of the journey. Let them agree in reporting that there is a range of mountains with a chain of lakes below; let them differ in the detail of the maps they draw, estimates of height and area (within a few miles) and so on. We should all be strongly inclined to admit the mountains and lakes, allowing for errors of observation in detail. No one would feel quite certain who had not himself witnessed the alleged facts: but on the other hand it would not occur to him that all had hypnotized themselves into believing what they narrated. Now the number of those who have had the mystical experience is much greater than one hundred, and moreover the character of the experience is such as to render the chance of autosuggestion or insanity extremely small. On the whole the mystics have been men and women of blameless lives and have made life better for those around them. That being so, even we who have not made the experiment ought to regard their experience as a good indication of the existence of a being, far higher and better than we, who is able to enter most intimately into our experience and bestow new energy for the tasks of daily life. And it should be added that the number of those who have had some touch of mystical communion with this being is probably much larger than is suspected; for men do not easily confess such things, nor does publicity favor sincerity in this matter.

There is here no peculiar way of religious knowing. There is awareness of the object and there is a profound emotional and practical response to the stimulus of the object. So there is to a lesser degree in the knowledge of a rock or a tree or any other physical object; so there is in one's awareness of his own thinking process. Awareness or beholding is the subject's attitude in its contemplative or theoretical aspect; response, emotion, pleasure, pain, desire constitute

the subject's attitude on its active side. All these of course differ with the object and with the state of the subject. If one insists that the way of knowing differs with the object known, there are indefinitely many ways of knowing, and the point becomes a verbal one. But as regards the method pursued there is clearly no essential distinction between the mystical and any other knowing. It is the method of hypothesis and experimental verification. True, measurement is not applicable here, because religion does not deal with spatial objects; but qualitative data seem to be available, and that is for the present purpose enough.

In one point, however, there might seem to be a deeplying distinction. Religion claims to have commerce with an infinite being; no mystic has been persuaded that the object of his ecstasy is finite. Yet the method of physical science applies only to finite bodies, finite velocities, finite energy; and in general we have no observation of the infinite. We can no more behold infinite collections than we can count an infinite number. It might appear then that the claim of religion to know an infinite being demands some unique avenue of knowledge not found in other ways of knowing.

The answer is found in a trait of the mystic experience. The Divine Being there revealed is indeed not directly given as an infinite or perfect total, but there is a quality in the datum which seems to imply these. This quality, which is itself directly given, is that of containing more than is given. Take, for example, the character of benevolence. The experience of the Divine presence reveals a being whose benevolent love embraces all human beings, and much more. It embraces all sentient organisms, however many. It even embraces the inorganic, in the sense that the inorganic reveals the values of order, novelty, and beauty, and thus becomes good after its kind. Now the point is that the very essence of this divine benevolence is to extend itself without limit. Were it to find a limit, there would be also a principle in it of indifference or

hatred. The benevolence of the Deity is felt to be a self-extending benevolence. As actually infinite, it could not be experienced by men; we have no experience of an actually endless collection. But the trait of self-enlargement which is directly felt as a quality of the Divine love is a guarantee of an infinity which we could not experience to the full. Let no one think there is anything obscure or unusual in such a quality. It is familiar to everyone in the thinking of every-day life. We all acknowledge that the series of whole numbers is infinite, and we never have seen and never shall see, the infinite collection of numbers. The reason why we are sure of the infinity is that the few numbers we do know contain the principle of adding one more. In fact, the first two numbers, one and two, suffice to guarantee infinity; for two is one more than one, and two is defined as similar to one in the property of being followed by one more—whence comes three, and so on. This assurance, which is the basis of mathematical induction, may be transformed from the vague awareness of every-day experience into a precisely formulated logical deduction; it is no surer in the one case than in the other. But it is just the sort and degree of assurance which is contained in the mystical experience of self-expanding benevolence.

No doubt it is in this wise that men get the concept of a perfect being. As Descartes saw, the concept could not have been reached by human thought heaping up one finite good upon another to any conceived amount. A new principle is needed besides that of increase, viz., the principle of self-increase. Unless some experience had given us such a principle in the realm of values, we should never have thought of an infinite value.

Let this suffice as regards the method of hypothesis and verification in religion. But there remains the supplementary method, confirmation by implication from other and admitted facts. The mystical experience, no matter how overwhelm-

ingly it sways belief, must submit to tests. Again the case here is like that of objects in the physical world. We feel sure of the existence of yonder hill, for we have climbed it; doubt seems impossible. Yet we look for confirmation in the coherence of the hill with the geography of its environment, in the repeated seeing of it day after day, and so on. So the mystic should, and in most cases would, test his observation. And the tests are of two sorts: the one imposed by the experience itself and the other furnished by reflection upon the real world. The first test, which is imposed by the experience of the mystic, is practical and along the line of value. It comes about in the following way: The object of the mystic's awareness is a mind or spirit of limitless benevolence; in being aware of the ever-widening divine love, the mystic inevitably feels its value; and to feel its value is to feel that it ought to be fulfilled. Wherefore his conduct will display an ever-widening interest in the welfare of all conscious beings, of men most of all, since their possibilities are so much richer than those of the animals below them, but nevertheless with no limitation to mankind alone. This zeal and fervor which in itself knows no limit, must of course be limited in its application by the powers of the individual and the necessity of concentration upon specific tasks. In this way it assumes the form of concrete deeds. And further, as no lasting good can be accomplished without intelligence, the divine benevolence counsels the development of intellectual powers to the highest possible degree; and also for another reason, viz., that pure intellectual contemplation is a good in itself. Thus the religious man finds in the divine love, which is revealed to him, a productiveness which creates further values. This is to be sure not a confirmation of his vision by other and independent facts; but it is a good, pragmatic test in so far as it at least tends to make life fuller. Just so the theory of electricity is confirmed in that it enables us to run our electrical machines, and the belief in our fellows' minds is con-

firmed by its necessary connection with the values of our own lives.

There is also the advantage that a ground is afforded for at any rate a large part of current morality. A moral code by itself must remain arbitrary unless grounded in some principle at the bottom of things. A humanist may proclaim a gospel of universal love; a Nietzsche may urge the ethics of the ruthless superman. There is no umpire between them save the appeal to principles outside either—principles of the real world. The teaching of the mystic offers such a principle, and so far fills a necessary part; and in affording a ground, it also provides hope rather than despair in times of defeat—a hope which the most resolute will cannot ensure. For the doubter will whisper, "the universe may be against you," and no mere will can abolish the doubt.

But these practical tests, indispensable as they may be, do not satisfy thought. We must pass from value to fact. Do the known facts of our universe, physical and mental, imply or point to a supreme being? An affirmative answer has been presented for centuries in the form of the so-called proofs of God's existence. These arguments, as is well known, take either a wholly a priori or a partly empirical shape. The former constitutes the ontological argument; the latter is exemplified in the four arguments which start from certain given facts and mount to a supreme being. These four are: (1) the argument from conditioned things to a first and all-sufficient condition of them; (2) the same put in terms of value, arguing from the given imperfect to a presupposed perfect being (the Kantian argument from morality is a weakened form of this); (3) the argument from design; (4) the argument from wide-spread if not general human belief—*consensus gentium.*

It is not necessary here to estimate strength and weakness in these arguments, but it is necessary to remove an obstacle to the fair examination of them. Most philosophers today,

except the scholastics and the absolute idealists, believe that Kant refuted them once for all. Now let us remember that Kant's alleged refutation turned upon his assumption that no object can be proved to exist unless it is *anschaulich*—verifiable in sense-perception. From this assumption it follows at once that an infinite or perfect being cannot be proved to exist; sense-perception does not give that sort of thing. The only intellectual certainty that Kant admitted was that given in physics and mathematics; there is a lurking materialism in this, as if the physical world and its quantitative characteristics were all that can be truly known. True, the materialism was covered up by Kant's teaching about the moral law; yet he did not admit intellectual knowledge of the moral law or its implicates; these were practically certain, but not ontologically demonstrated. Kant's assumption was of course a piece of a priori dogmatism; had he witnessed the later developments of physical science he might have granted that arguments from implication and probable inference have great weight even in the absence of verification by sense. Upon such arguments, and without direct confirmation from observation, are based the theory of biological evolution, theory of heat, and atomic theory. And there is no a priori reason why the facts of nature might not suggest or imply a spiritual being.

If however we come, through these five arguments, to conclude that there is a Deity, our knowledge of him is in no way different in principle from the knowledge of evolution, of heat as mode of motion, or of atoms. It is based so far on discursive reason, circumstantial evidence, and probable inference. Not that men believe in God chiefly on these grounds; it rather seems likely that sincere believers have always some degree of mystical experience. But when the belief in God is based on both these sources—direct observation and implication from other facts—we have religious knowledge in the fullest sense attainable to us. The hypothesis of a supreme

being is then as far confirmed as confirmation can go. And there is no line between such confirmation and the ordinary confirmation of every-day common-sense knowledge or the proofs of a scientific theory. Knowledge is one and the same wherever there is any degree of certainty; one and the same with its two mutually supporting factors of observation and implication.

There is then religious knowledge, and its way is the way of all other knowledge—plain observation and inference.

SOME DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWING[1]

A. STEWART WOODBURNE
Professor of Christian Theology, Crozer Theological Seminary

A PSYCHOLOGICAL approach to the problems of knowing recognizes at the outset the organic unity of life. Knowing is a function, a process or a disposition characteristic of a living organism. The mental and neural life together in all of their phases form an integral whole. The time has forever gone when we can treat knowing as the business of a faculty of the mind, separable from other faculties. Every segment of mental experience is characterized by cognitive, affective, and conative factors. And in every experience it is the entire organism that reacts. Cognition is an attitude of awareness. The awareness is aroused by a situation in which the organism is affected either pleasantly or otherwise. The attitude tends to express itself in some overt and appropriate way. Thus do we analyze experience for theoretical ends, but practically these factors never occur in isolation. The extent to which feeling and active elements enter into and fuse with cognitive responses is only beginning to be appreciated.

There are three primordial characteristics of an organism: irritability or the ability to receive sensory stimulation, conductivity or the power to transmit the stimulus to the center of the nervous system, and correlation or the ability to organize stimuli with relation to one another and with relation to response systems. Here again we analyze for theoretical convenience, but the experiences are so rapid and well integrated as to be inseparable. Doubtless the cognizing of an object was gradually achieved through being sensorily stimulated by its qualities, and learning to associate them in the object. The increasing capacity for discrimination enables

[1] A paper read at a meeting of the American Theological Society.

us to determine which qualities of an object are essential and which accidental. The repetition of experiences of a particular type is also an important contribution in the eduction of relations. It is thus that qualities are correlated in a cognized object, and objects correlated in classes.

The processes of cognition, involving as they do the understanding of relations, include the perception of meanings. We correlate mentally qualities with objects, or objects with other objects so that the perception of the one functions as a symbol of the other. Knowing a meaning is to comprehend something of the relations subsisting between objects, or between the perception of objects and the feeling responses they evoke. A meaning thus indicates not only a relation between objects, but also our own attitudes and reactions to them. Meanings have no substantial existence, but are themselves the products of active, knowing minds. The development of meanings is characterized by growth toward definiteness and discrimination. It synchronizes with understanding functions and relations of objects in particular situations. As the person develops in maturity, the process involves diminishing obscurity and increasing definiteness. It is marked by growing stability and coherency with other meanings as a result of which we can respond more appropriately to various situations. Meanings that are to some degree stabilized and made coherent with other meanings enable us to anticipate types of situations and to react appropriately. The more we are able to stabilize and make coherent our meanings, the better we are able to organize them for the purposes of thought and action. Classification and definition are thus the culminating functions of the meaning process.

The tendency to act is characteristic of an organism. This tendency expresses itself in a number of typical attitudes or dispositions to act in particular ways. We assume these attitudes mainly because of the interpretations or meanings we have achieved as we have reacted to objects in previous

experiences. Meanings thus have an anticipatory function. They symbolize objects and relations, and these symbols enable us to meet similar situations. We assume different attitudes toward the same object or situation because of the different meanings associated with the object. A rainbow, for example, is a symbol of one type of meaning for a meteorologist, but it had quite another type for the pious Hebrew. Our attitudes are thus both cognitive and conative in their significance. What we do in a particular situation is tied up with the meaning we employ on that occasion.

Psychologically speaking, the cognitive process is the same whether we are concerned with religious data or scientific data. Each of these areas represents an attitude or disposition to act in a characteristic way. And each of them includes cognitive factors, because knowing is an element in all our orientations. It is not possible to single out any specifically cognitive attitude in discrimination from an affective or a conative, though it may be possible to note that one or other of the factors predominates in a particular experience. It would be an incomplete view of the nature of our attitudes to suppose that knowledge is only possible when one assumes the scientific attitude. It would be more correct to say that, when we assume the scientific attitude, we are cognizant of certain meanings; and when our attitude is religious we are aware of certain other meanings. The fundamental difference between religion and science is in the sets of meanings that we employ.

As already indicated, meanings are conveyed by the employment of symbols. Scientific meanings cannot be conveyed in any other way. The scientist in describing the physical universe makes use of symbols of the properties observed and calculated. If he finds it necessary to revise his findings, he is quite prepared to discard one set of symbols for another, and to continue his work. Scientific knowledge is thus articulated by educing relations between symbols that bear meanings

in regard to the physical universe. Religious meanings are also conveyed by means of symbols. Statements of belief concerning which knowledge claims are made are formulas or symbols of a faith growing out of experience. The character of the experiences precludes the same degree of precision in the meanings attaching to religious symbols as scientific symbols. Scientific symbols as laws stand for statistical averages, but very little of the phenomena of religion lends itself to statistical treatment.

The chief difference between religious and scientific knowing is not a matter of the knowing process. Neither is it a difference in the logical process involved. Any knowledge-claim, whether it be with reference to a religious meaning or a scientific meaning, must be subject to the same tests of validity, so far as logic is concerned. Both the scientist and the religionist are indebted to inductive reasoning in constructing meanings. Now the basic principle of induction is the uniformity of nature. In fact, some such postulate is necessary to any belief that the universe can be apprehended rationally. The course of nature is not a series of fortuitous detachable events. Neither are human life nor human history. The logics of scientific and religious knowing alike presuppose uniformity. It has often been supposed that science is more dependent on uniformity than religion. Present-day scientists are not so sure of that as the scientists of a generation ago. Nevertheless there is a sufficient degree of uniformity in the behavior of the physical universe to allow the formulation of statistical averages. So also there is a sufficient degree of uniformity in the experiences of people who are religious to admit of certain dependable postulates, such as the postulate of God.

When we turn to the employment of meanings in science and religion, we observe that the scientist makes use of metrical concepts whereas the religious man makes use of concepts that symbolize vital, personal relations. Exact science

selects certain aspects of the physical world which may be observed and measured, so far as feasible under laboratory conditions. Obviously there are aspects of the world and of life that are not amenable to measuring-rods and logarithm-tables. Anthropologists and biologists are able to make use of metrical meanings to increase our knowledge of human organisms in the interests of health and satisfactory adjustments to the environment. There are, however, other experiences that we know to be just as dependable and which lead us to employ such meanings as patience, sympathy and love. We arrive at scientific meanings by observation and calculation. We achieve social meanings by living together in the relations of person to person. Our religious meanings are to be found in this sphere of the personal. Such concepts as friend, wife, redeemer and God articulate for us meanings that belong to the non-metrical and the personal. They are, however, just as much the instruments of cognitive processes as concepts like vitamin, hormone, electron and energy.

Other ways of distinguishing between the aspects of reality that are known religiously and those that are known scientifically are used by various students of the subject. One such method makes the differentiation on the basis of values and facts. Scientists are concerned with facts while religious people are interested in the creation and conservation of values. In a rather general way this differentiation is serviceable. But it presupposes a separation between the factual and valuational areas that is easily exaggerated. It is doubtful whether any facts are as naked as is sometimes supposed. When people are sufficiently interested in facts to observe, analyze, classify and explain them, it is an indication that they evaluate them with reference to some end. On the other hand, values do not exist in a vacuum. It is always a person who does the evaluating and always something that is evaluated. The concepts science and religion themselves are abstractions. In actual experience there are people who employ

scientific and religious techniques and meanings. Behind all the operations of science and all the activities of religion there are living, feeling personalities. Human interests, quests for various types of satisfaction lie behind both types of processes, the scientific as well as the religious. In science the chief concern is truth—truth for human ends—and truth is one of the major concerns of value. The experiences of value so interpenetrate one another, as well as interpenetrate with factual experiences that we must use this distinction sparingly.

When the distinction is made that science deals with the actual and religion with the ideal, it appears at first sight that science has the advantage over religion so far as knowledge is concerned. Actual objects and phenomena may be observed through the processes of sense-perception, and in particular instances under laboratory control. The results of the observations may be carefully analyzed, classified and placed in series of a temporal or causal nature. In the physical sciences the exactness of the observations is augmented by measurements. To be sure each observation, measurement or experiment yields but a small segment of knowledge, for scientists deal with problems piece-meal. By means of inductive logic they widen the areas of their conclusions, and thus their meanings become more general and abstract. Religious people are always concerned with ideals that carry meanings transcending any experienced values. Of course, scientists also look ahead to the control of greater areas of life, and to the enlargement of the scope of their knowledge. The scientist lives by hope no less truly than the religious man. The question confronting us is the extent to which a hope or an ideal may be considered knowledge. Obviously it is not knowledge in the ordinary factual sense, gained by sense-perception. But reflective persons do not build their hopes on sheer fantasy. They are rather goals, receding goals no doubt, but goals that at least mark a further stage of a

development that has been noted. Their ideals are thus indications of trends which they claim the right to believe are already in process and likely to continue. The articulation of an ideal is in that sense a product of knowing processes.

There is a further sense in which ideals, whether those of the scientist or of the religious person, have significance as knowledge. They are meanings or interpretations of facts about the universe and life that have been attained by the cognitive processes of educing relations and correlates. There is abundant evidence that they function in actual experience as determinants of action. The researches of scientists and the cults of religious people are sustained by the knowledge that progress is possible toward ideal goals. It need scarcely be added that an ideal is known for what it is—a meaning, an interpretation, a hope. It is the product of rational intelligences endeavoring to comprehend the meaning of life and the universe in their larger relations.

It is possible to make this further differentiation between religious and scientific knowing that the former is concerned with social meanings and the latter with meanings of a mechanical character. This difference is based on the distinction between organic and inorganic factors in the environment. We assume quite different attitudes toward the living and the nonliving. Toward the former our attitudes are social; toward the latter they are mechanical. An animist may regard an inorganic object as the abode of a spirit, and take a social attitude toward it. On the other hand, data about persons may be observed and assembled toward which a mechanical attitude is assumed. Things are inert, unconscious and unsusceptible to irritation and feeling. Persons have the powers of motion and resistance, are self-conscious, and susceptible to irritation and feeling. Such discriminations help to determine the differences in the attitudes we assume toward things and persons. When a person takes a scientific attitude toward his environment or some fragment of it, he employs meanings of the

inorganic or mechanical sort. When his attitude is religious, he employs social concepts and meanings, and treats it as amenable to a social approach. In human relations the social attitude is much more fruitful than the mechanical for the enrichment of experiences, and social meanings much more significant than mechanical. We know persons best by living with them, not by measuring them in various ways. So religiously we make knowledge-claims about our cosmic relations. By the social attitudes of prayer and worship we know something about the universe in which we live that we could not ascertain by the method of exact calculation. God is known through worship and prayer, rather than through analysis and calculation.

The knowledge of God is more than a heritage from our fathers or a revelation from himself. It is a moral and spiritual achievement. As a man pitches his life on the higher levels of moral idealism, placing his faith in the reality of spiritual values, there grows upon him the conviction that he is in touch with the most fundamental reality. Knowledge comes through the experience of fellowship with God as one ventures to live in the way that most contributes to the enrichment of life, personal and social.

THE BAPTIST POSITION [1]

WILLIAM R. McNUTT

Professor of Practical Theology, Crozer Theological Seminary

"He hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father" (Rev. 1:6).

"Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage" (Gal. 5:1).

A CORRESPONDENT tells me that recently he had listened with sympathetic interest to a devout Jesuit of his community in an address, entitled "The Catholic Position." In the course of the address the speaker illustrated his case by referring to "The Baptist Position" by way of contrast. "I am writing you," says the letter before me, "to inquire if there is such a thing as 'A Baptist Position.'" That query has inspired my thought on the matter and dictated the theme of this article, "The Baptist Position."

Stated thus declaratively I wish to affirm that there has been and is a distinctly Baptist position. History bears ample witness thereto, current thought is its heavy debtor, and present-day practice among all the churches confirms the thesis. The Baptist position has borne and continues to bear a quantity and quality of fruit that is quite capable of either challenging or humiliating us, the children of our "fathers in the faith"—challenging us to be worthy of our inheritance or humiliating us because we are *not challenged* by it. To put it in other phrase, that Baptist position has been a leaven which has modified or changed, in degree great or small, the position of every other Protestant group.

Proud as I am to be among those who have entered into that goodly Baptist heritage, I am yet among those least desirous of inspiring or increasing a certain kind of sectarian-

[1] A paper read before the Baptist Ministers' Conference of Philadelphia and Vicinity, April 9, 1934.

mindedness. From that kind of thing the world still suffers far more ill than one likes to mention—divisions, animosities, hatreds; not to mention torn and ruptured community life. On the other hand, if we in America are ever to emerge from our competitive and divisive denominationalism it will be when each brings into the open those verities which he treasures, pleading their cause as worthy a goodly place in that larger synthesis which ultimately may give to the world *one Christianity* capable of commanding the souls of all because many shall have contributed thereto their finest and best. Today, therefore, I am before you as an adherent of the Baptist position, an advocate of the soul of that position as worthy of a place among immortal religious verities.

The Baptist fellowship, world-wide in its scope, is the product of a single creative idea, that of the competency of the human soul, competency within that highest realm known to human experience, namely the religious. Competency! that is the magic idea which has called dead men to life and set them marching as crusaders beneath banners aflame with a message of hope to those bound and of cheer to those struggling to hold on to hard-won liberty. "He hath made us kings and priests unto God!" "Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage." These and like Scriptures have they sung and taught the hearts of others to sing until a mighty chorus rises heavenward today as they celebrate the freedom of the human soul in matters of religion.

[2] Competency, as a doctrine, states the conviction that

[2] W. T. Whitley, *A History of British Baptists*, p. 61 says: "Baptists had existed for a generation. . . They now had opportunity to grow freely and to show which of their principles had any vitality. *Their central discovery was that the soul was competent before God;* able to respond to him, to learn of him, to labor for him, without the intervention of any other man."

John R. Brown, Ph. D., *Christianity in a New World*, p. 77, writes: "The Baptist principle is one and only one. Around it great influences and practices have grown up, but the essential principle as distinct from any formal principle is one. It may be stated in many ways, but it has never been better put than in that old Reformation formula: the competency of the soul before God."

James S. Kirtley, *The Baptist Distinctive and Objective*, p. 7, states that distinctive as follows: "Any person who ever lived or ever could live has as much inherent right to deal personally with God as any other person who ever did or ever could live."

Geo. W. McDaniel, *The People Called Baptists*, p. 32, names three, the second being

God has endowed every normal human with capacities adequate to his fullest religious needs. It holds that within that religious realm he is so wholly competent as to be above the necessity of kingly authority to instruct his soul, or priestly prestige to contact God on his behalf. He is his own king and his own priest before God, whom he is competent to find on his own behalf and to the saving of his own soul. Human institutions and external arrangements created to assist him religiously may conceivably be good or bad, but in either case the individual is above them, and may reject them each and all if he chooses so to do—he is created competent in his own right.

Concerning this doctrine the late Dr. E. Y. Mullins wrote: "This conception of competency of the soul under God in religion is both exclusive and inclusive in a measure which sets forth the distinctive contribution of Baptists to the religious thought of the race." And again: "Observe then that the idea of competency of the soul in religion excludes at once all human interference, such as episcopacy and infant baptism, and every form of religion by proxy." This creative idea is in the background as a directing and controlling force in all distinctly Baptist thought whether it deals with the externals of polity or those more subtle considerations that lie within the depths of personality.

Behold this doctrine at work in a society where multitudes are daily battered and beaten, discouraged, down-cast, crushed to death like so many worms beneath the feet of the powerful. The idea of competency before God steals quietly

---

"individual responsibility to God for the performance of duty; the others being a church as composed of baptized believers and the complete sufficiency of the New Testament as a '*rule of faith and practice.*'"

Speaking (p. 35) of individual responsibility he says: "Individual responsibility means freedom of choice, freedom to read the Bible, freedom to interpret the Bible, freedom to approach God, freedom to serve God. The Baptists would have a Bible within possession of everyone who wants it. They would say, 'Read, interpret and decide for yourself.'"

John W. Johnson (Berkeley Bap. Div. School) writes in *The Journal of Religion*, Jan., 1929, Article on Balthasar Hübmaier: "As stated many times, the genius of Baptists is faith, freedom and fraternity. These concepts cover their spiritual releasement, their intellectual liberty, and their ecclesiastical democratic polity."

into their hearts—and these same men stand erect, throw off their fears, their burdens, break their chains and the hold of their oppressors. They are free men, competent in the sight of God, yea sons of God! And woe be unto him who would continue in attempts at control and oppression! What we see is simply and only the work of a single, creative idea. When it speaks, it is as with the voice of God; and at its behest men stand erect, take up their beds and walk, they march and sing!

That idea exalts each and every man. Competent before God, he was not created to be a coward, or slave, or pawn, or underling. He was conceived in the Father's heart as one worthy to bear the "image of the heavenly," and earth must be so ordered as to make this divine heritage an actuality to every man who purposes to win it. There may be the high and low according to the rating of human society, but the doctrine of competency fires a man with the conviction that there is no such distinction before God, and that there must be no such here so far as he is concerned.

And let it be plainly said here, parenthetically if you will, that no teaching known among men is more greatly needed today than this: the soul of every man is competent before God.

"Voluntariness" is an older Baptist term found much in the speech and literature of our fathers. It states the case for competency in its power to set men free. Religion is voluntary, and wholly so. One may be religious or not, precisely as *he* chooses. No one may coerce him in this matter, for to do so is to sin against the divinely guaranteed integrity of his soul. God who made him competent in matters of religion may provide many "means of grace," and even salvation from sinful living, in his beloved Son, and yet he may reject them all. Not even God may *compel* him to do otherwise. Competency exalts free choice beyond the reach of all authority external to man himself, including the authority of God.

"He hath made us kings and priests," cries St. Paul, and millions of Baptists reecho the cry.

But let us hasten to observe that "Voluntariness" brings responsibility in its train; tremendous responsibility, soul-*sickening responsibility!* One may in the rightful exercise of soul-competency turn his back upon the Father's house and stray into far countries; but he cannot escape ever the weight of his own folly. He may reject every means of grace proffered by God or men; he is free to do so if he chooses, but the responsibility therefor is his own. As he is competent to reject, he is also competent to receive; whichever he does is, in the end, his own responsibility. In this sense every man is *responsible* for his own soul and its eternal destiny.

> But to every man there openeth
> A high way, and a low,
> And every man decideth
> The way *his* soul shall go.
>
> —*John Oxenham.*

Baptists have no disposition to retreat from the logic of their great tenet of soul-competency. It may, under certain aspects, appear a harsh teaching, yet it is the harshness of the storm that makes the strength of the mighty oak. They believe stedfastly that even God rests his case before man who is both jury and judge. That implied responsibility cast upon man is the divine method of growing him in strength, the divine method of developing all his powers. Sensing this great fact, Saint Paul wrote, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling," being encouraged that God is working among and within you, instructing, teaching, persuading, loving.

It is interesting to observe that the whole ministry of our blessed Lord fits perfectly into the pattern demanded by the doctrine of competency. He came as a shepherd to *win* and *lead* the sheep; he never attempted to coerce them. He came to *beseech* men on God's behalf, not to command them.

He went among men and from them *called* those disciples who *elected* to hear his call; all *freely* joined his company. As a teacher he was accustomed to end every discourse with a familiar "and what do you think?" His authority was not that of the dogmatic, but rather that of one who, recognizing the competency of each, stated the case as he saw it, and then left the decision to the taught. Take the case of the Good Samaritan: he told the story simply and artfully, then turned to his questioner and asked, "Who do you think was neighbor to him who fell among the thieves?" In like manner he plead the whole cause of the Father's love and his own ministry of good-will and reconciliation. He came as an advocate of the Divine whose cause he plead throughout his days; there is no single instance recorded wherein he failed to recognize fully the soul-competency of those to whom he spoke. He came to seek, to woo and to win, and from that mission and method he never departed. If on occasion he was called upon to rebuke, it was with a view of gaining entrance as a teacher who had a great cause to plead. We think the most despairing word of all his public life is that wherein he told certain men they had committed the unpardonable sin. And what had they done? Simply this; they had completely closed their minds, they had refused to do any more thinking or make any further choices. They had abdicated in favor of the religious status quo and not even the Holy Spirit could insinuate a new idea. They had violated the competency of their souls—the unpardonable sin!

If Baptists be asked to defend their position regarding the soul-competency of the individual, in view of a prophesied religious chaos should all begin to live that doctrine, they will gladly accept the challenge. They will deny the danger of riotous individualism and point to their own denominational solidarity in vindication. Some eleven million Baptists have come to a large degree of vital solidarity under the banner of individual competency and freedom. Without resort to

any of the common coercive devices, such as creeds and ecclesiastical courts, they have arrived at a more vital and living unity, a unity in the spirit of the competency of each and the liberty of all. Their own history vindicates their faith that if good men be left to "freedom in the Lord" they will migrate toward a common position at the center, and that external props and scaffolding in the form of authority but delay the migration. Real Baptists are the incurable apostles of freedom.[3]

It will be recalled that the Reformers, having broken away from the authority of the Western Church made a dash for soul-freedom; but they forthwith became fearful in the midst of victory, fearful of religious anarchy, and straightway substituted the authority of the Book for the authority of the Church. It remained for Baptists to take the field of soul-liberty evacuated by the Reformers and carry their victory to a successful issue: unity in largest freedom.

The nub of the whole matter of unity, despite large individual liberty, lies in loyalty to Christ. Each is persuaded, *in free exercise of his own competency,* to elect Christ the Lord of his own life. Under that lordship, free men walking with him, making their own interpretations, doing their own thinking, ordering their own lives in accordance with what he says to each of them, come strangely to converge at a common center sufficiently agreed upon the great things that matter most—they arrive, if you please, at the fundamentals, the basic concerns of those who put their hope and the hope of the world in their Lord and in the kind of abundant life he personally sponsors for all men.

[3] "No historian may successfully challenge the claim of the Baptists that one of their fundamentals has been true and absolute soul-freedom. For this principle of religious liberty they have fought and suffered and sacrificed. They have taken very seriously the implication of Protestantism that every person has the inalienable right and duty to approach God in his own way. Neither state nor creed nor sacrament nor priesthood may intervene between man and his Maker. It is the birthright of every person in his own experience to deal immediately with God. No government can deny any man liberty of conscience. It has been observed that this principle of soul-liberty is the 'secret essence of the rights of man and the indestructible soul of revolution.'" —*Prof. Conrad H. Moehlman, "Baptists Are Going to Berlin," "The Christian Century," February 7, 1934.*

Now, being disciples of Christ by free choice, disciples by the route of soul-competency, Baptists at once assume the responsibility of organizing themselves into a local church; a thoroughly democratic church, a church "of the people, by the people, and for the people." People who own discipleship to Christ, being competent in matters of religion, consider themselves competent to call into being, by and of themselves, a church of Christ.

And such a church of competent souls, whose only recognized Lord is Jesus, the Christ, has a very clear concept of its distinctive mission. Its all-inclusive task is to reproduce in its members and in all others whom it may effectively touch, the rich, wholesome and full sort of life which he incarnated in himself and set as an undying challenge before his friends. This church comes into being as a means of uniting the endeavors of the group in a task, to a greater than which it is never the lot of mortal men to give themselves; if earth has for mankind a divine undertaking, this is that undertaking! The Baptist position holds it to be great enterprise to harness common men and women to so heavenly an undertaking. Competent souls create a competent church capable of becoming a positive force making for the Kingdom of God among men.

A local body of disciples who have constituted themselves a church of Christ and who now set about their soul-challenging labors will honor many means and methods. Whatever promises to give them aid is worthy of trial, and whatever proves its worth will receive the honor which is its due. Thus has time and experience brought to place of honor the good minister, the Bible, the ordinances, principles and methods of education, music, art, literature, history, and what not? Almost every field of human interest and knowledge has been made to yield some treasure as a contribution to the larger success of the God-given task to which the local group has been called. And thereby is actualized in the lot of common

folks the inspired insight of him who wrote, "We are workers together with God!"

The Baptist conviction of soul-competency is wide in its creative outreach. It quickly lays a restraining hand upon all legalisms that venture to enter the realm of religion. All such come on feet of authority; though sometimes the feet are sandal-shod. Even so, Baptists are keen as a frightened deer to scent danger, and rarely have been trapped. They have been and are the unyielding foes of all sacramentalism and all creedalism. Sacraments and creeds have a perverse way of gathering to themselves such a degree of authority as to become coercive; and competent souls will not be coerced! This hostility to sacramentalism is seen in the historic opposition of this people to infant baptism, not primarily because it is unscriptural, but rather because the practice begets sacramentarian ideas; and in their persistent refusal ever to adopt a Baptist creed.[4]

Though Baptist people are among those whom history calls "Bible Christians," a characterization in which they rejoice, yet all down the years they have been very wary of any authoritarian views of the Bible; they have uniformly pronounced, "The Bible is a sufficient guide in matters of faith and practice"—a *sufficient* guide, but never an *absolute* guide. It is a sufficient guide to the competent soul; which competency is equal to the task of interpreting the Bible. The Bible was made by men, competent and inspired men to be sure, and each man is held to be competent to interpret it for his own needs and his own salvation.

Another corollary of competency is the heralded Amer-

[4] *As Baptists we abhor formal and man-made creeds.—"Watchman-Examiner," February 15, 1934, Editorial on "Convictions."*

1. *The Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, 1880. Statement of general belief held by the churches:* "The Divine Inspiration and Authority of the Holy Scripture as the supreme and sufficient rule of our faith and practice; *and the right and duty of individual judgment in the interpretation of it.*"

2. Indianapolis, June 16, 1922, Northern Baptist Convention, substitute motion of Dr. Cornelius Woelfkin: "The Northern Baptist Convention affirms that the New Testament is the all-sufficient ground of our faith and practice and we need no other statement." (Vote, 1,264 to 673.)

ican doctrine of separation of church and state. It was a Baptist doctrine exclusively, long before it was an American doctrine. It was written into the Federal Constitution, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," not by accident but at the earnest behest of the Baptists of Virginia. The reason is not far to seek, for had not Roger Williams been driven out of the Boston Bay Colony because he thundered against the presumption of magistrates to enter with authority the realm of conscience and religion? And had not Baptists throughout the Colonial period been the persistent foes of any and all intrusion of the arm of state authority into the affairs of religion? A soul competent in the sight of God is therefore above the state in matters of the soul—that conviction produced for us all the cherished "American doctrine of separation of church and state."

The latest notable reverberation of this doctrine which sets the competent soul above the dictates of the state is the famous Macintosh Case. The Yale professor, a Canadian Baptist, seeking citizenship in the United States of America, refused to say, in advance of any war that might be, that he would bear arms as directed by his adopted country. He was refused citizenship. The case was carried to the Supreme Court where a five to four decision was rendered against the applicant. The minority decision, handed down by Mr. Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes, is a notable document which pleads the supremacy of the individual conscience over the state, the competency of the soul before God, and the necessity of the state to retire from that realm. And it is not without interest that the Mr. Chief Justice is a Baptist born of sturdy Baptist stock.

Moreover, the conviction of soul-competency controls the attitude of Baptists toward the ordinances of baptism and the Lord's Supper. Each is emptied of any and all sacramental implications; they are symbols pure and simple. They are

"means of grace" given by the Lord for the use of the churches in the work of enriching the lives of men and women. Their virtue is that they teach and edify. The exclusive emphasis on immersion as the mode of baptism is chiefly not, as some suppose, because it is the New Testament mode exclusively, but primarily because that mode peculiarly holds in honor the competency of the soul; only those old enough to exercise competency, in the form of personal choice, are likely to be candidates for immersion. On an historic occasion Dr. Lemuel Call Barnes is reported to have said, "The tap-root of Romanism is the baptism of infants." That was a strong Baptist word on behalf of immersion, a mode never popular with parents who had infants to be baptized.

In this warfare which Baptists wage as between free, competent souls on the one side and various forms of restraint and coercion on the other, it is agreed by common consent that there can be no truce and no resting-place save in a free and full surrender to One only; that is to Jesus Christ, high ambassador of the eternal God, who alone has right to rule over competent men and women—and over them only when they have surrendered of their own free will and accord. Endowed by the Creator as one competent, a man may not abdicate the throne of his own person to any other man, neither may he capitulate to the government of the United States, he may bow before God only, or before him whom God hath sent as Lord of life. To bring about *this* capitulation on the part of every man constitutes the first great task of the church universal, thus fulfilling that prophetic longing: "Before him every knee shall bend and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."

Yes, there is a Baptist Position, a position held in honor by every true Baptist, but it is no longer the position of the Baptists exclusively. Like leaven it has wrought a good work in wide areas other than Baptist. It has become the common property of many other millions, and still marches on from

victory to victory. Not all branches of the world-wide church acknowledge the validity of the doctrine of competency, but Baptists have in the main trusted to its guiding star through ten generations, and today have every reason to continue to follow its gleam. With all their hearts they commend it to all the Christian world with the growing conviction that it lies very near the heart of the gospel and very close to the heart of God.

And finally, we pray for an ever enlarging unity of all those who are Christ's and all those who follow after him as loyal disciples and loving friends. If ever there comes the day when men, good and true, sit together to consider prayerfully the riches in grace and life which the gospel of our Lord has wrought in the earth with a view to heralding " the full gospel "—the gospel as it was and as it has become—Baptists must be present at such a conference to present their great discovery, their jewel tried in the fires of long experience, namely that Christ Jesus makes common men to be kings and priests unto God. This, they must urge, is a glorious truth worthy of being held in honor by all men, as they believe it to be held in honor by the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

THE CONSTRAINT OF CHRIST[1]

MORTON S. ENSLIN
Professor of New Testament, Crozer Theological Seminary

The love of Christ constraineth us (2 Cor. 5:14).

In these half-dozen words, written nearly two millennia ago, is contained an insight into life which has been but rarely revealed to a weary, groping world. The rallying call which has been raised in every age to enlist recruits for a new rebellion has been freedom. The sound of the breaking of shackles has come to be felt to be the very essence of the heavenly music. And each emancipation has been heralded abroad as the veritable prelude to the millennium. Yet as the historian looks back over the long story of what men have been pleased to call civilization, he can hardly restrain from assent to the weary word of the greatest of the Hebrew prophets: "They have healed also the hurt of my people slightly, saying: Peace, Peace, when there is no peace." The bars of wood have been broken one after the other, only to be replaced by stouter ones of iron. In this pathetic and fruitless groping for a freedom which is as constantly elusive as a will-o'-the-wisp, it is high time to raise the question if the game is worth the candle. Is freedom to be found by them who seek for her? Has not the story of the years made one thing clear: there are cords about us, so intricately and elusively tied that to seek to break them draws them but the tighter? Might it not be wiser to cease our fruitless quest of an imaginary something about which everyone seems to know everything except the means of finding it, and instead to raise the question: Since on every hand constraints and bonds are to be found, is it not conceivable that they are but a part of the eternal nature of life? When we raise that question, these words of Paul—"The love of Christ

[1] A sermon preached in the Seminary chapel.

constraineth us"—shine in new brightness. If ever words of any man can be spoken of as divinely inspired, surely these are of that number. They give expression to the paradox of life: We are free only because we are slaves. We can hold only because we ourselves are held. There are rules in the game of life that cannot be broken.

This note, which must commend itself to every thinking man and woman, was clearly glimpsed by the great apostle. He could cry aloud in tones of ringing defiance: "Am I not free? am I not an apostle?" but only because the vision of Christ which he had enjoyed had brought the complementary truth that he was the slave of the one who had set him free.

Thus these words "The love of Christ constraineth us," take us into the very center of his thinking. Too often their significance has been missed. Countless and learned attempts have been made to understand what he meant by the "love of Christ." In technical grammatical parlance it has been hotly debated whether *Christ* is a subjective or an objective genitive. Is it the love which Christ has for us, or is it the love we have for Christ? To my mind both lines of inquiry fall far short of the real answer. The real answer is far more profound. The love of Christ which constrains, dominates, masters not only Paul, but every Christian, is neither our love for Christ nor his love for us, but is a love boundless in its scope which is made possible as the Christian becomes identified with his Lord. In a word, it is the Christ-love. To understand this as Paul did we must recognize that for him the very heart of the gospel lies in the words "in Christ." By faith in Christ and the power of his resurrection the Christian came into immediate fellowship with his Lord. He was baptized into his death, and thus leaving behind his old sinful nature was raised into newness of life. But this new life he no longer lived alone. As a result of this experience a mystic change had taken place; as he had been crucified with Christ, so now Christ lived in him. The new

man was thus actually a Christ-man. The words "in Christ" or "Christ liveth in me" are accordingly not to be understood as being figures of speech. Paul meant them to be understood literally. Thus faith for Paul did not mean an intellectual assent to notions, however valuable they might be; to a measured degree "conviction" approaches the truth; yet actually the best understanding of what faith meant to Paul is reached by substituting the phrase *new life*. The faith of the Christian was the new life he was living in Christ; the life Christ was living in him; better yet the new life that was being lived by the new-born Christ-man.

This key opens many doors in Paul's writings which have long seemed barred. He speaks of having the mind of Christ. What does he mean? To the man who is actually in Christ the new life is revealed in such a manner that he feels himself impelled to it. He is so completely linked to Christ that he is no longer able to distinguish between his own desires and goals and those of his Lord. The distinction, in fact, no longer exists. He has the mind of Christ not because he thinks *like* Christ, but because Christ is actually thinking in him; his words are really Christ's own. Christ speaks through him.

Against this background the words of the text take on new meaning. The love of Christ is thus the Christ-love, the new outlook on life which has resulted from the believer becoming identified with his Lord. Because Christ himself is love there streams over Paul from communion with him the power of love as the motive power of all ethical action, of life itself. Thus the very sign of his freedom is the sign of his bondage. There can be no half-way measure or compromise about it. It is not so much a constraint from without as from within; it is none the less a constraint. The man who professes to be a new man, to be in Christ, and yet who resists this compelling wave of power is a living lie; he is not in Christ at all, for if he were, not only would he not be able

to resist, but would not want to. Those faculties which could exercise such a judgment would no longer be alive.

At once the chilling voice of logic makes itself heard. Paul, we say, is riding two horses at the same time. Why, if this divine economy of faith prevails, does he concern himself further with those who have become converts? Why give ethical admonitions to those who are faltering? How *can* they be faltering? Here we find again the age-old dilemma: theory and practical experience. Logically, of course his admonitions and sharply defined rules of conduct were unnecessary. He who was in Christ would have supplied by the Spirit all necessary insight and help; would feel himself borne along in the great current streaming from Christ. Yet all about him on every side he saw fellow Christians whose conduct he disapproved. Thus by precept and example he sought to help and encourage those who, while in Christ, were yet but babes in Christ. The fallacy is obvious and cannot be explained away. Logic, however, is at times only the hoop about barrels to keep them from expanding. Its breach in Paul is one of the traits that has endeared him most to those who have known him best.

Even in his own day Paul was not understood. His insistence on freedom from the law was understood, or at least accepted, as if it meant license; his teaching of faith—new life with all its demands and consequences—came to be understood as the acceptance of dogmas divorced from conduct, and aroused the protest of a James. Nor has he fared much better in subsequent generations. From a man whose own life was a glowing example of the mystic truth he sought to preach, who under the constraint of the Christ-love gave himself in a world which had at least but little desire for him, he has been transformed into the sinister figure who muddied the limpid waters of the preaching of Jesus and who has been so dreadfully responsible for the warping and transforming of Christianity that we hear so much about today.

In this sermon I have no wish nor opportunity to seek to defend or rehabilitate Paul. Many of the problems which convulsed him have solved themselves; many others have arisen of which he never dreamed. His rugged—almost stubborn—honesty, his hatred of sham, his conviction that as an instrument of God, unworthy though he might have been, he must speak the truth as God had given him and was compelling him to speak—these qualities sometimes offend us as they did his first hearers, for he gave body-blows, not as one beating the air. None the less, far from being a liability to modern Christianity, he stands as one of its greatest assets. We may have to translate his ideas as well as his language; but his insight revealed and gave expression to some of the profoundest truths of life, which never wax old. And of such the one I have chosen for a text is certainly one.

The difficulty we find today in grasping the significance of Paul's conception "in Christ" is evidenced by our fondness for giving it a figurative interpretation. This I have suggested appears to me far from Paul's intent. Living in the thought world of the first century, familiar with many other cults, each with its lord, with whom the worshiper not only came into contact, but actually became identified, he found no difficulty in the representation of such a relation between Christ and Christian.

For us there is an obvious difficulty. We may say Christ; we think Jesus. And for the most orthodox Christian it is difficult, if not actually impossible, to conceive himself as *in* Jesus of Nazareth. For Paul that difficulty did not exist. Christ was the eternal Son of the Father; to be sure, he had lived in human form for a short while; that was, however, but one phase of his real life. And in his death he had provided the means of man's transformation. Thus the Christian, in the last analysis, was not losing his identity in an historical figure, but was, with his fellow believers, comprising the body of the Lord of life. And this conviction appears

to me with very little adaptation not only possible, but the one real hope for Christianity today. The history of mankind has been the story of men and women striving to keep open the channels into their own lives from the source of true life itself. And again and again there have been moments in time when men have felt that in this individual or that an especial influx of this life—most folk prefer to call it God—has been present. For Christians, Jesus of Nazareth has occupied that position. In him men have seen not only what he actually was but all that they have been able to conceive a god could be. "Those who have seen me have seen the Father." We call him Jesus; but we mean the source of strength to weak and faltering hands, the breath of life to fevered and discouraged hearts. And fortunate are we Christians that our early brethren painted such a portrait that when we view it the additional lenses we employ do not make it seem grotesque.

The sense of oneness with that which stands secure, of union with a spring of never failing life, that is what we need today; the confidence that though our reservoirs are but small they are piped to a never diminishing sea. When translated into such terms, this ancient word of Paul appears to me the sole hope for disillusioned, discouraged man.

But such a confidence, such a status if you will, brings its own tremendous obligations. This the apostle realized. This Christ-love, this union with the Lord of life, constrains, masters. In simplest terms, "the love of Christ constraineth us" can be adequately rendered by the two little words, *I must*. We hold, but we are held. There is no room for childish prattling about liberty and freedom. When God had been pleased to reveal his son to Paul, the latter was no longer free; from then on he was a slave. Woe was him, if he did not preach. The hand of constraint was ever upon him. It drove him over weary miles, subjected him to the gravest perils and most uncongenial men. Yet through the

recognition of what he now was, all that might have been distasteful glowed in a new light. His hands might be chained; his heart was aglow. His life was no longer a disorganized one, where he must seek to pick and choose, fearful lest his choice be unwise; no longer need he strive to kick against the maddening goad. He was conscious that though he must do this, must not do that, there was nothing detrimental to his dignity in his servitude. His stigmata as Christ's slave were the badges of his dignity.

As I said at the beginning of the sermon, it appears to me that the quest for freedom that has always lured its millions is directly responsible for most of the disappointments and needless sorrows we have had to bear. Since we live in a universe whose essential principle—if there be any at all—is that of constraint, how idle it is to prate about being free. Birth, death, race, color, the physical and chemical laws of life—they are here; what can we do about them? Most intelligent persons realize that a stone falls down—not up—and accept it. But against other laws as certain as the law of gravity we try so hard to struggle. And when public opinion, the policeman, the teacher, or whoever or whatever it is says to us: "Go" or "Come" or "Do this," how easy it is to feel aggrieved. Our personal dignity is being affronted, our liberty assailed. How childish it all seems. It is all part of the law of life, the constraint which is everywhere present.

A man marries. At once new obligations, new constraints flood upon him. He must support his family; he must realize that some paths in which perhaps he had hitherto wandered are now definitely closed; he must live in such a way that his children, if these be granted him, may look at him with pride and adoration, not with contempt. A minister is called to a church. At once new obligations, new constraints flood upon him. He must do his parish work; he must appear in his pulpit at the specified time; he must take his parish to his heart as if it were his own family. A student

goes to college or seminary. At once new obligations flood upon him. Tasks are assigned; he must do them. If he wants his degree, he must do his work. His opinions as to whether he shall attend his classes or not, take his examinations or not are of no consequence. The homely bit of workshop morality applies here as it does throughout life, "He that will not work shall not eat."

So we might multiply examples. But it would be useless. Every choice we make entails ironclad consequences; and many of what we call choices are not choices at all. The quip about the sweet young thing and the philosopher is well known. Said she, "Sir, I accept the universe." Said he, "Gad, you'd better."

Jesus of Nazareth went to his death on Calvary. The night before, while his friends slept, he is said to have struggled in agony. Why? The city was full of his enemies? Yes, but he could have slipped away in the darkness; could have stilled his voice, and his enemies would speedily have forgotten. But he could not. There were compulsions upon him; he could not deny himself. And that compulsion was far more exacting than the soldier who led him away to shame and death.

So with us. If we desire to give our lives any form, any pattern, we will not try to sail a crazy and fantastic course, whirling the wheel now one way, now the other to indicate our own complete freedom as helmsman. We will push out into the deep; set our course by the abiding stars of life; welcome the winds, be they head or following; set our sails to them; and hold our rudder true.

HISTORICAL TYPES OF METHOD IN THE CURE OF SOULS

JOHN T. McNEILL,

Professor of the History of European Christianity, The Divinity School, The University of Chicago

PERHAPS it would be more clear to the average person untrained in theology if we translated *cura animarum* the "care" rather than the "cure of souls," just as we usually translate the title *Cura Pastoralis,* "Pastoral Care." Or we might use the expression "the guidance of souls," which would tolerably well translate Gregory the Great's phrase "regimen animarum" in the work whose title has just been given. "The art of arts," says Gregory, "is the *regimen animarum,* the guidance or governance of souls." By the Cure or Care or Guidance of Souls we mean then not merely the clinical treatment given in acute cases of soul-sickness, but all that pertains to the nurture, the correction, the welfare, the emancipation, the integration of souls. It is none the less true that the writers on this subject, whether ecclesiastics or psychologists, give primary attention to the sickness or abnormality of the soul, and use the analogy of the physician and the patient.

We need not define "soul" except to say that in speaking of the treatment of a soul we have in mind a ministry to the personality. Such a ministry has commonly been exercised in the name of religion; and our purpose is to bring to notice certain types of method which appear in the history of this function of religion.

I

The cure of souls is not of course peculiar to Christianity. In the most primitive societies there is recognition of its importance. The person who differs from the normal type, who violates accepted codes or tabus, is put through an appointed

form of discipline to restore him to normal life and communion. If he has a nervous breakdown and exhibits symptoms of insanity he may be induced to wear curative precious stones, or to drink the powder of jet, or sentenced to be placed in solitary confinement. If he desecrates a holy place, or rite, or violates a tribal custom he may be tortured or exiled or immolated to expiate the offense and placate the divine wrath. The measures taken are motivated partly by the need of the protection of society, partly by the desire for the restoration of the disordered or recalcitrant individual, or they are exemplary punishments, to deter others from similar behavior.

Primitive Indo-European culture went further than this. It developed the specialist in social guidance, the director of conscience. So in early India the *acharya* or "spiritual guide," to use Buhler's translation, was not merely an instructor; he was the minister to his pupil's soul. Under his training the pupil was to be "reborn"—his life and personality remade and integrated in the pursuit of the good. There developed a system of penance for sin—for sin was the cause of all the need of such penance—and ceremonies of reconciliation at the completion of assigned penances were used to mark the return of the disordered soul to health and of the offender to social normalcy. So too among the Celts, as Cæsar observed, offenders against the tribal law were sometimes excommunicated, or placed outside the benefit of the sacrifices, and driven into exile. The term "directeur de conscience" is used by d'Arbois de Jubainville to indicate the functions exercised by Celtic druids and priests. In Ireland a druidic adviser was commonly found attached to the person of the king, whose conduct this expert criticized or directed. This function was taken over by Christian clerics, who were confessors to the princes.

In ancient Babylon officials who conducted both public and private penance also appear, and repentance with expiatory austerities was the price of sin. In confession a list of

interrogatives, a questionnaire on details of conduct, was employed by the priest: La Grange has noted the resemblance here to Christian manuals of confession. The guide of souls in Græco-Roman life was often a philosopher—a sophist or a stoic, to whom people brought their personal and religious troubles.

The concept of sin, or offense against deity, as the cause and root of personality disorders, is general. Or to put it the other way, illicit or sacrilegious courses of action—the breaking of a tabu, or of an oath, or of any religiously sanctioned tribal law—are regarded as requiring the amendment of the personal life by some authorized form of discipline; and methods of corrective discipline and expiation, usually administered by specialists, are regularly evolved.

II

That most vigorous of all religions, Christianity, has exhibited this common characteristic, and at different periods institutionalized somewhat different methods of soul-guidance and correction. At the beginning it does not seem to have taken over its disciplinary usages from any of its predecessors, but to have evolved them in response to need. Procedure in cases of a personal wrong or insult is indicated in Matthew 18: 15-17, in words attributed to Jesus but suspected as interpolation. There are four possible stages: complaint is made personally; before witnesses; the congregation; let him be as a heathen. It is not indicated that thereafter the offender may return—he is apparently regarded as incurable. Yet in 1 Corinthians 5, a fornicator is delivered over to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, *that the spirit may be saved.* The penalty is apparently inflicted by the whole congregation, "gathered together" for the purpose. Paul urges: "Put away from among you that wicked person." But in 2 Corinthians 2: 6, the same or another sinner is to be reinstated: "Censure by the majority

of you is punishment enough, and so you must now turn round and forgive and comfort him" (Goodspeed).

The public character of this corrective discipline was retained through centuries. It was still public in Tertullian's time when the intentional humiliation of the confession or *exomologesis* is evident from his description. The offenders seeking restoration, fasting and in the garb of mourning, kneel before the presbyters, and beseech all to intercede for them before God. It was still public in Origen's time when nevertheless the private direction of conscience is unofficially gaining importance. In parts of the East the penitents were divided into "weepers," "hearers," "kneelers," and "co-standers," each group having an assigned place without or within the church. The procedure was still public in the time of Ambrose, although he made a practice of advising privately with offenders, apparently to decide whether the offense ought to be publicly confessed. The increasing tendency to leave to the priests responsibility for discipline is in many ways apparent. But it has been shown that Augustine and Gregory the Great presupposed a public exomologesis; and while Leo the Great forbade *reading* a detailed confession, he did not legislate away the public confession of the early church.

The early Christian type of soul-guidance is marked, then, by this humiliating public, official, penitential discipline. There are many other aspects of it, such as the house-to-house visitation, rebuking and exhorting of individuals, and the growing element of catechetical instruction, which cannot here be discussed, as such discussions would take us too far afield.

It is important to note that the public discipline was regarded as possible to the offender only once. Baptism was a renunciation of sin; and the church disciplinarians thought themselves generous in allowing a reconciliation once after baptism. They often called penance a second baptism. As

late as 589 a Spanish council repudiated the then growing practice of the iteration of penance.

III

The outstanding element that determines the type of method in the cure of souls in the Middle Ages is the development of the confessional. The medieval confessional took shape under the influence of the Penitentials, a series of handbooks for priests in the ministry of penance, which had their origin in the Celtic monasteries of Britain and Ireland. They owed something to the psychology of the conflict with sin that had been worked out in eastern monasticism and brought to the west by John Cassian, whose writings familiarized all intelligent western monks with the eight deadly sins (later reshaped into seven by Gregory the Great) and their numerous offspring. A number of the Penitentials use Cassian's scheme of the sins for their outline, and others are otherwise indebted to him. Probably also the practice of soul-guidance in the Celtic lands before their Christianization has to be considered as one of the reasons for the extraordinary development of penance in the Celtic churches and their missions.

Soul-care under the Penitentials was most intimate and elaborate. Confession and penance and reconciliation might take place as often as there were sins to confess. Confession and reconciliation were entirely private and the "seal of confession" was apparently observed. All sins, even the slightest, were to be fully confessed. The duty of such confession was laid upon all. Under the influence of customary law the penalties often involved payment of fines in restitution for personal wrongs done. Sometimes vicarious penance was permitted.

The Penitentials consist largely of statements of the number of days, months or years of penance that ought to be assigned for a given offense. Accordingly they name and

elaborate nearly all possible sins of clergy and laity. But it is evident that they are not intended to be used merely as iron-clad codes. Often the writers urge intelligent understanding of the status and needs of the individual sinner. "All are not to be weighed in the same balance, but there is discrimination for each." The aim of personal amendment is not seldom stressed. Fundamental in the process of rehabilitation was a course of discipline by which the offender made amends for his misdeeds. Having made his peace with the church he could feel once more at one with God and man.

The Penitentials violated the practice and precepts of the former days, and were resisted by conservative bishops; but as the latter could not resuscitate the old canonical discipline, they were obliged in the end to make terms with the principles of the Penitentials; and after further centuries of evolution we find the fully developed medieval confessional. In this, private confession guarded by the sanctity of the seal was the rule. Penance was repeated, and Innocent III required its practice at least once a year. All sins, even those of thought, were to be confessed. Confession was made to a priest; and absolution was sacramental and supernaturally sanctioned.

The confessional has often been criticized, not only with regard to the abuses that gathered about it, but with regard to the principles incorporated in it. Perhaps in principle the point of severest criticism of it is the requirement of confession at stated times, whether the confessant has something which for the health of his mind it is needful to reveal, or not.

But our judgment of this will depend upon presuppositions, and those who regard the church's act in reconciliation as carrying divine authority will find advantages in the confessional not available to others.

Perhaps the most helpful aspect of the confessional lies in the opportunity to unburden the troubled conscience to

one who will share without revealing the confession, and so to relieve the tension of secrecy, which, to some types of personality, sometimes becomes intolerable.

IV

Although Luther was impatient of the "whole sea of laws and impossible questions about 'cases of sin,'" and "disgusted, wearied, shamed and distressed at the endless chaos of superstitions" that had gathered about the confessional, he did not wish to abolish it. He wished rather to utilize it as an optional, confidential interview of the sinner with the minister. He insisted, however, on clearing away the whole accumulation of casuistry by which a man was taxed to declare "what sins he had committed against the three theological virtues, the four cardinal virtues, what by the five senses, which of the seven deadly sins, what against the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, against the eight beatitudes," etc. He counselled deliberately going to the eucharist without confession once in a while, in order to avoid dependence on "works" for justification.

The Reformed Church leaders went further and professed to abolish the old confessional outright. But they at once proceeded to establish a method in the cure of souls that involved features imitated from the early church together with elements that are medieval. Calvin advises him who is in anguish of soul to "have recourse for relief to a private confession to his own pastor," reminding him that it is not for nothing that ministers of the church are said in Matthew 16: 19; 18: 18 to forgive sins and loose souls. Confession may indeed, he thinks, be made "to any member of the church who may seem most fit; yet as for the most part pastors are to be supposed better qualified than others, our choice ought chiefly to fall upon them." They on their part should expect to fill this function; but resort to confession, he insists, should remain free. (*Inst.* III, iv., 12.)

Thus Protestantism did not in effect so much abolish as transform the confessional. Its obligatory aspect is removed; its principal purpose is the relief of distressed souls; supernatural sanctions are no longer claimed for it, except on the ground that it fulfils a scriptural command. This attitude to the confessional is attended by other factors that go to complete the Protestant ideal of soul-care. There springs up in the Reformed Churches an elaborate system of discipline. The eldership, Calvin spoke of as those "pious, grave and venerable men in whom is lodged the power of correcting faults." This power they exercised as a body with resolute severity. (*Inst.* IV., iii, 8.) Attention to the details of moral duty in the Reformed Churches early resulted in the rise of a new casuistry; and in the detail and subtlety of their attempts to set forth "the whole duty of man" the Puritans almost equalled the Jesuits. The Kirk of Scotland in the 1560's had to give official pronouncement on numerous cases of conscience. In 1633 William Ames wrote his *Medulla theologiæ de conscientia eius jure et casibus,* a treasury of casuistry. The Anglican Church, by its Canons of 1604, enjoined secrecy in the modified confessional which it practices: "We . . . do straitly charge and admonish him, that he do not at any time reveal and make known to any person whatsoever" matters committed to his trust in the confessional (cxiii).

Wherever in Protestantism the cure of souls has been efficiently pursued, there has been employment of the two agencies I have pointed to: first, the modified confessional, in the confidential advice of the pastor to those who sought it, with the encouragement also of mutual confession of faults, and secondly, the exercise of a discipline on the basis of certain norms of behavior. While the nerve of this discipline has been relaxed, it is still a perceptible fact in Protestant church life, which continues to exhibit moral standards somewhat different from those of the total society. In addition

to these factors the old catechetics of Protestantism gave much opportunity for personal religious and moral analysis and council.

That great Puritan pastor, Richard Baxter, in certain passages in his *Reformed Pastor,* well illustrates Protestant methods in the cure of souls. Baxter sought to stimulate family religion, reading and prayer, and the reading was to include " some useful books besides the Bible." Offenders against the church morals are to be privately rebuked; if impenitent, to be " reproved before all." He recognizes that " the principal use of the public discipline is not for the offender himself but for the church. It tendeth exceedingly to deter others from similar crimes, and so to keep the congregation and their worship pure." The church must avoid communion with impenitent sinners. He offers a proposed formula for the public admonition of an impenitent offender, who is suspended from communion. On his repentance the church should heartily receive him back into communion. If sinners remain impenitent, permanent excommunication must be resorted to. Baxter gives prolonged attention to the subject of personal instruction. This is far more than the imparting of information; it is the effort to bring conversion of life. After group instruction they are to be dealt with " in private, out of the hearing of the rest," where they will better receive frank criticism. In the case of women, others may be within sight though out of hearing. Much questioning is evidently intended; but those who have little practice in self-expression are to be tenderly led. Though Baxter's presuppositions on the way of salvation are widely different say from those of Saint Cummian the Long in the seventh century or of Burchard of Worms in the eleventh, there is a real parallel in the method recommended for conducting the personal interview.

In his *Pastoral Theology* published in 1850, three years after the author's death, Alexandre Vinet, a distinguished

French Protestant writer, deals at some length with the cure of souls. The point of view is seen to reflect the new scientific criticism of the time. It sounds modern to find in Vinet the plea for the recognition of "psychology" which is to be known both from books and from experience. The pastor is to deal with all kinds of people. The most pious may be unbalanced, *e. g.,* having more faith than works, and must be studied and so corrected as to be restored to a state of "equilibrium." Souls in the stage of trouble that precedes conversion in a time of religious awakening, and those who feel only "a vague but insupportable anguish" are to be met by the pastor sympathetically and led, as the condition of their relief, to make a sincere confession. Often when this occurs, "the soul as if released from a burden which was crushing it, rises up and walks." The seal of confession is to be inviolate, and its faithful maintenance by the pastor assured. But the pastor should not be pledged to secrecy in the case of the confession of public crimes. In some cases a confession to other persons may be necessary; sometimes even a public confession. It is clear that Vinet has read some of the Roman Catholic casuists; he occasionally cites, *e. g.,* Massillon. But the essentials of his teaching follow closely that of Calvin.

Methodism, with its open-air preaching and general unconventionality, appealed to large groups neglected by, or alienated from, the Established Church in England, and served to meet the emotional and moral needs of frontier populations in America. One of the chief reasons for the permanence of its success was that it early devised a system of discipline which put the newly generated emotional energies into harness. Mutual confession and correction took place in the class meetings. In these, says Wesley, the Methodists "began to bear one another's burdens, and naturally to care for each other. Evil men were detected and reproved. They were borne with for a season; if they for-

sook their sins we received them gladly; if they obstinately persisted therein it was openly declared that they were not of us." The leaders of these societies formed a court of discipline. Careful visitation was made yearly, and the refusal of a ticket of membership automatically excluded the person concerned. The class meeting became a training-ground of expression and of personality, as well as a basis of discipline. Guidance for behavior and procedure for the correction of offenders were provided for in the *Discipline,* which was revised from time to time in the Conferences.

V

In recent years the cure of souls has been approached from points of view made possible by the newer trends in psychology. The medieval monk would have been bewildered if he could have looked into Professor Charles T. Holman's recent book: *The Cure of Souls, a Socio-Psychological Approach.* He would miss the basis of a code, and the approach from the conception of sin as the cause of the soul's disorder. Yet beneath such phrases as "personality-reorganization," "achieving an integrated personality," "adequate social adjustment," "spiritual therapeutics," one recognizes a range of principles that are by no means new or untried. In fact, it is remarkable how the observation of human faults in far-off times corresponds with the scientific findings of psychologists of today, and still more, at how many points, as Janet and other psychologists have pointed out, the older treatments find justification in the new soul-care. Beginning from the scientific basis Doctor Holman is later able to show the dynamic power which religion alone supplies, on which the physician of souls may depend. This book, along with a number of others in recent years, goes to indicate that psychiatry will in all probability not replace pastoral guidance, but come to its aid. But with the appearance of such a book, we are evidently at the opening of a

new era in the history of the cure of souls. The ministry to personality will be at once scientific and religious; it will seek the fulfilment of personal values through internal and external adjustments, emancipation from social and cosmic fear, stimulation to hopeful activity in positive relations with other people of good-will, and in reliance upon a friendly universe.

WHAT IS THEISTIC EVOLUTION?

ARTHUR STEVENS PHELPS

Sometime Lecturer, Christian Esthetics, Berkeley Baptist Divinity School

"Jehovah God formed man out of the dust of the ground" (Gen. 2:7a).

By the term theistic evolution is meant the Darwinian theory of development, expanded by Henry Drummond and emended by modern science. Because the theory has been modified and extended in certain respects, does not imply that scientific theologians have abandoned it as untrue. It is God's method of creation. It explains how the Creator "made man out of the dust of the ground": not in an instant, in accord with Archbishop Ussher's chronology printed on the margin of the King James Version of the Bible, but according to the Creator's plan, which takes more time. The creation of the lower animals preceded man and prepared for him. Man was created more than six thousand years ago. I have seen a mummy in Cairo 7,200 years old. Remains of human skulls have been unearthed that are millenniums older than that Nile dweller. Nature has preserved fragments that help the archæologist in his studies. The elder Professor Dana showed us, in his class in geology at Yale, a bit of the hide of the famous mammoth, whose flesh, after his hundred thousand or more years in cold storage in the glacier, the Eskimos ate greedily.

Theistic evolution sees the Creator's hand in every step of the spiral evolutionary process. Which would be more worthy of wonder, to make a chair out of a block of wood, or to endow a block of wood with the power to turn itself into a chair by the creative force—the "little carpenter," as Huxley called it — within it? Hath not the Potter a right over the clay? What a joy to his children to see the creative hand at its work! "Lo, these are parts of his ways," exclaimed Job in awe, "but how small a whisper do we hear

of him!" If the Almighty hath wrought in a manner different from my childish preconception, it is not atheism to follow his steps. It is God's doing, and it is marvelous in our eyes. . . "But those missing links in the process!" Yes, but they are links in the divine chain, five rounds on the ladder up which the Ascent of Man has been made. First round, mineral; second round, vegetable; third round, instinct; fourth round, reason; fifth round, new birth. To use a layman's language, the first link is the divine introduction of life into inorganic matter; the second link is the divine introduction of animal instinct into the vegetable kingdom; the third link is the divine introduction of human reason into the lower animal creation; the fourth, and crowning, link is the divine introduction of God's life into the human soul, the new birth. This is the step that Nicodemus found it so difficult to understand, how a man that had been once born, could be twice born. Thus the climax of the long program is reached: "In this the children of God are manifest; his seed abideth in him." The evolutionary process has required millions of years—geology, anthropology, are too young to find out how long. Imagine the time it must have taken to learn to stand on the hind legs! There came a time when divine "selection" chose three differing ways of branchial activity. One was provided with four legs, like the ranging bear. One was assigned four arms, like the arboreal ape. One was endowed with two of each, two arms, and two legs: the man. Through this fact, by divine decree, man became ruler of the other two, being more, and yet less, limited than they. If he lingered on his patient way for a few millennia as cousin to the anthropoid ape, on his migration heavenward, who should be so hot about it? He has reason to be proud that he did not stay there. And, after all, the devil did not create the ape, but God. And what God hath cleansed, call not thou common.

How about the conflict between evolution's story and the early chapters of Genesis? That question is not difficult to solve, if one will be patient and reflect for a moment. It is a literary question, and not an ethical one. The hypothesis of evolution does not agree in detail with the Genesis narrative, nor does it in the slightest degree impugn its honesty. Remember that we are occidentals, and that these pages were written by orientals. Our ways of thinking are material, mechanical, scientific; theirs were spiritual, symbolic, poetical. You cannot measure a dream with a yardstick, nor weigh figures of speech in a peck-measure. The pictured impression is in fact far nearer the truth, far more accurate, than the geometrical demonstration. God chose for his written revelation the literary vehicle, rather than the cold logic of dogma. Witness what Einstein has done to the lines and orbits of astronomy! To the poetic genius of biblical literature, the iron shoes of the doctrinarian "go limping on a smooth pavement." Said Lowell: "There is a truth of fiction that is more veracious than the truth of fact."

Genesis is history, written with the purpose of bringing man to God. If we care more for our scientific theorizings and our scholastic theologies than for the vision of God in the garden, we must suffer the dwarfing consequences of our inelastic minds. "The Bible was written not to show how the heavens go, but how to go to heaven." Contrast the Genesis narrative of its first two chapters with those of Babylonian, Assyrian, Chaldean, or Persian origin, if illustration of this truth be needed. The graven tablets are in the British Museum, at our hand.

Literature and dogma are somewhat uneasy in each other's presence, like two persons that are so different that it is almost impossible for them to understand each other. This is the more to be regretted from the fact that we cannot get along without the helpful ministry of either. We should go hungry in body if the ground brought forth noth-

ing but flowers. We should grow hungry of soul, if it brought forth nothing but edibles. I have said that Genesis is literature, and that it is history. A great deal of misunderstanding has arisen from the fact that history was not at that time what history is today. Genesis nowhere calls itself history. Today, we define history as a record of important events that have actually taken place; and we justly resent an historian's including in his works moralizing fables and myths. Yet, even now, we cling to a large number of stories, like George Washington's chopping the tree down, for their moral effect. But we do not call them history, if they are not acknowledged facts. But that was not the definition of history in Old Testament times, nor in "Homer's" day; nor, indeed, in the time of Herodotus, "the father of history." In their days, history was a collection of documents, some true, some invented. Everybody so understood it. It would be rank provincialism on our part to think otherwise. Provincialism makes it hard for a person in one century, or in one state in the Union, to understand the view-point, and even the speech, of dwellers elsewhere or elsewhen. Perhaps I can illustrate this by the use of the word *walnut*. In most sections of our country, when we hear the word walnut, we think of an English walnut. In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the word signifies a hickory-nut. Enormous political confusion was caused, during the presidency of Calvin Coolidge, whose unparalleled popularity made it certain that he would be elected to a third term, if he would consent to be a candidate. He declared in the most positive terms that he would not accept reelection, by saying: "I do not choose to run!" But outside of New England, nobody knew what he meant by the word *choose*. Now, if we could join Bangs's *Houseboat* party *on the Styx*, Noah, and other celebrities of Old Testament days, would dispute our use of the word *history*. There is no deception involved in their use of the word, by either writers or colla-

tors. Given an event or a structure, the Hebrew mind sought an explanation for its origin: "How did we come by our Feast of Purim?" "What did they call prophets in King Saul's day?" It took the longest chapter in one of the Old Testament books to answer the first question, and a single verse to answer the second. They were interested in causes; while we are more interested in the results that come from them. Thus we supplement, as readers, what they set down, as writers. They wanted to know how the cow got into the cornfield; we want to know how to get her out. By the cow in the field, I mean to illustrate the presence of sin in the world. They found moral evil; and they asked: "How did it get here?" Perhaps, if one could find the hole in the fence where the cow got in, it might help to keep her from getting in again, after some "practical-minded" American had run her out. Moral evil was there; where did it come from? It must have come from some person in the golden past being hard pressed by temptation, and giving way to it, and thus starting their descendants going wrong. As food is the big problem in the other half of the world (today, a Chinese does not ask, "How are you?", but, "Have you filled your belly?") the temptation must have been connected with eating. And so forth, and so on. Thus was written the story of the garden of Eden, struck through and permeated, in every detail, with tremendous moral earnestness. The ancient way of writing history and biography, then, by explaining the manners, customs and ceremonies they found in their day by inventing origins, like symbol-sermons to children, and parables, is most fortunate for us, as it has given us some of the most inspiring religious writing in the whole blessed Book. And I will withdraw the word *fortunate,* and substitute the word *providential.* It would be desecration to call such stories myths, and it would be daft to assert that if one tale be invented like a parable, therefore "you can't believe anything."

It is interesting to note that the first man, according to Genesis, was a very primitive creature. He had not even the cliff-dwellings of the troglodytes, so often referred to in the prophets; he wore no clothing, and we are told how he came by his first suit. His food was the fruits of the soil and wild game. The picture would be recognized by an anthropologist anywhere, as an accurate description of primitive man.

The proofs that our Creator has employed the method of evolution are now, in the main, so many and so convincing, that they appear irrefragable. Before birth, the fœtus repeats its antecedent history, passing through, in the same order, the varied animal forms by which he has ascended to his human estate. Sometimes he shows on his throat long after birth the marks of fish's gills. In every schoolyard there is a boy that can wag his ears like a horse. The infant is stronger in his grasp during the first half-hour of his life than he is when a year old, thus testifying to his arboreal ancestry. He begins life on all fours, swings his arms when he walks, as he used to when they were forelegs, and when aged returns to the aid of one cane, sometimes two, to connect his "forelegs" with the ground. His lifelong moral struggle, even up to his "second childhood," is with the inherited animal instincts that are almost too strong for him. It is the presence of these instincts, in part, that has led to the theory of reincarnation. The interest every normal child feels in the lower animals—and in fire and water —is too close to be attributed to mere curiosity.

God has written our history in our frames and in our brains. The devout student of his ways loves and adores the Lord and Sovereign of all Life more devoutly, as he learns the wonders of his working, and looks down the long ladder up which the hand of the Almighty hath led his vagrant feet.

THE SWORD OF CHRIST

By STANLEY I. STUBER
Minister, First Baptist Church, Clifton Springs, New York

It is now certain that at least a few of our Christian leaders are taking our present social and economic plight very seriously. In fact they have now got to the point where they actually want to do something about it. They are all convinced that the present situation must be changed for the better, and soon; but, sad to say, they disagree upon the *means* and the *methods* whereby the revolution may be accomplished. Some want to use physical force in the class war; others will use nothing but the weapons of moral force and love.

I

Thus earnest Christian people are divided today not only on points of theology and ecclesiastical practice, but also on the ways and means of realizing a new world-order in which the will of God will be supreme. This conflict is especially keen in an organization called the Fellowship of Reconciliation; an organization founded upon the principles of brotherhood, Christian unity and peace. It is therefore most pathetic, although rather funny, to see within this fellowship not reconciliation, not peace, but division and strife. Recently the Fellowship has been split into two hostile camps on the issue of using physical force to obtain righteous ends, and, as a result, a few of the outstanding members (including Prof. Reinhold Niebuhr) have withdrawn their support. Dr. Edmund B. Chaffee, of the Labor Temple, New York City, remains as the champion of the F. O. R.; for those who continue to stand for social revolution, but only on the basis of non-violent force.

Niebuhr states his position in these words:

Recognizing, as liberal Christianity does not, that the world of politics is full of demonic forces, we have chosen on the whole to support the devil of vengeance against the devil of hypocrisy. In the day in which we live a dying social system commits the hypocrisy of hiding its injustices behind the forms of justice, and the victims of injustice express their politics in terms of resentment against this injustice. As Marxians we support this resentment against hypocrisy. As Christians we know that there is a devil in the spirit of vengeance as well as in the spirit of hypocrisy. For that reason we respect those who try to have no traffic with devils at all. We cannot follow them because we believe that consistency would demand flight to the monastery if all the devils of man's collective life were to be avoided. But our traffic with devils may lead to corruption and the day may come when we will be grateful for those who try to restrain all demons rather than choose between them. (*The Christian Century,* January 3, 1934.)

I think this will be exactly the case, for I am afraid that Niebuhr's position is more Marxian than Christian. Surely his spirit and method is that of Marx rather than that of Christ, and Marx had no use or respect for the Christian religion. It is really quite impossible to be a consistent follower of Marx and still remain true to the Christian position. Moreover, I do not understand why one must go outside of Christianity in order to detect, and to denounce, hypocrisy. If anyone has ever been against sham, deceit, hypocrisy in places high and low, that one was Jesus. He simply could not endure insincerity, either in religion or in personal life. All one has to do is to read the Sermon on the Mount to discover just how much Jesus hated pretence of any kind. (But I suppose Marxian-Christians do not read the New Testament any longer; now it is all *Das Kapital!*) One does not have to forsake the Christian religion in order to be free to combat either hypocrisy or all the devils that be.

The Christian religion is the arch foe of all the devils of this world. Jesus did not try to escape from the realities of the world—people of his own day thought he was too realistic!—neither did he establish a partnership with Satan.

He had the chance to; but he turned the "gracious offer" down. He met the devil face to face and challenged him to eternal combat. From that time on Jesus has been casting out devils, both from individual lives and from the social system. He did not fight the devil with the devil's weapons, but with weapons of his own choosing: with forgiveness, with a profound respect for the good in every soul, with the principles of brotherhood, with love. And he overcame the world; he won a great personal battle. Yet Satan has by no means given up the fight and for this very reason every Christian must continue the work which Jesus began, in his spirit and with his help. And if we expect to win out we will have to use the same weapons which he himself used. I truly believe that the kingdom of God cannot be built upon a Marxian foundation; the kingdom of God must rest upon God: and Jesus Christ has made known the will of God and the way of God and the method of God.

Let no one think for a moment that Christianity is not so much concerned about the injustices, about the social and economic wrongs of the world as Communism appears to be. Christianity in its very genius is revolutionary. It calls for justice and brotherhood and humble service for the good of all; it demands high character and cooperation and even the spirit and practice of sharing. If our religious radicals have decided that Christianity does not care for the poor, does not desire a better social order, they have arrived at their conclusion by looking at groups of weak-kneed, sentimental and impotent modern Christians, rather than at the genius of the Christian faith which can be plainly seen at work in the New Testament. It is because of the very fact that, by our miserable indifference, we liberal Christians have smothered the revolutionary principles of our religion that we must, for the sake of the world's salvation, rediscover Jesus' real message and honestly act in accordance with it without fear or compromise.

II

Now just what was Jesus' message? Just what was it like? That it was of a revolutionary nature we can have no doubt. He stirred up the people. They were astonished at his doctrine. He was ejected from the synagogue at Nazareth. The Pharisees and Herodians plotted to kill him. His own mother thought him insane. His disciples could not understand him. The Sadducees, because he upset their vested interests, tried to trap him. "We never saw the like of it!" the people said when Jesus went into action. The cries of Why? Why? Why? were to be heard on every hand. "Why do ye eat and drink with publicans?" "Why walk not your disciples according to the tradition of the elders?" "Why could not we cast him (the evil spirit) out?"

There is no doubt but that Jesus not only had the religious leaders of his day guessing; he also made them mad —so mad that they wanted to kill him. He gave a new interpretation to the law. He revised religious practice, basing it upon life rather than upon custom. He even told the hard-boiled orthodox religious leaders of his day: "Ye have made void the word of God because of your tradition." And they had! Again and again he said: "It was said unto you of old time, but I say unto you." Love your enemies and do not hate them. Go the second mile if need be. Turn the other cheek when necessary. Give good for evil. Practice what you believe. Worship the living God. Now could anything else be so astounding and revolutionary as this?

One of the most revolutionary features about Jesus' gospel was that its spirit was that of peace and good-will. He would establish the kingdom of God by means of individual and social regeneration and he had no place in his program for hatred and vengeance. The God of the king-

dom is a loving Father who, like the father in the parable of the prodigal son, has a great love in his great heart and will forgive. Such a teaching was pleasing neither to the Zealot nor to the Pharisee. To be sure, they desired and expected the kingdom of God, but its God would favor them and punish their enemies. He was a God of wrath and judgment; the God of the children of Israel only. This is why the Zealots, like our young Christian radicals, were anxious to fight for the kingdom, and why the Pharisees, like most of our Christian conservatives, expected God to do all the work in the building of the kingdom.

It should be noted that in all his revolutionary spirit Jesus did not, at any time, desert the best tradition of the prophets. As he said, he came not to destroy the law and the prophets but to fulfil them. That is, he would take them on one step in advance; he would develop still farther the genius of the prophets; he would base his spirit upon the saints of the past and yet not be bound to or by them—he would be free, as they were. And he never demanded that anybody else should be bound to the past, or even to his own teachings. He spoke of fellow workers, not slaves; he spoke of freedom, not bondage. The spirit of truth, he said, would lead men on to do even greater things and it would set them free. To read his teachings, even in this twentieth century, is to experience the freshness and vitality of growing life; to follow his life is to witness the Son of Man pressing on toward the goal even in the face of great odds, even against the tradition of organized religion and the military barrier of the state. Press on he would; his face turned toward Jerusalem and nothing could block his purpose.

Just as Doctor Chaffee so truly says in his book, *The Protestant Churches and the Industrial Crisis:*

> He (Jesus) knew that an external revolution was not enough. There had been such, time without end. He would strike deeper than that.

He would seek a revolution in the very desires of men. He would take out of their minds and hearts this insatiable greed and this overpowering ambition to dominate. But he knew this could not be done by force and he rejected force as a method of bringing in his kingdom. His method was the method of sacrificial love. He would resist wrong and aggression but he would resist always on the moral plane where alone could real changes be effected. Jesus expected by his teachings of sacrificial love and by his example of it in his death as a criminal to release in the spirits of men social forces which God could use to transform the world into a world of brotherhood. Jesus relied neither upon force nor upon law but upon the actual attitudes of men.

III

But this is not altogether true, you say. There are, in the New Testament, several instances where Jesus either relied upon force of a physical nature or advised the use of it. For example, he took a whip of cords and actually drove the money-changers out of the temple. Was not this the use of physical force? Moreover, at the night of his betrayal he advised his disciples to sell some of their garments in order to buy swords. Was not this a counsel to employ force? And, more than that, he said: "Do not imagine I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace but a sword." Now how does all this fit into the non-violence of Jesus?

It is very true that these passages do exist and that many times in the course of Christian history people have used them as a moral justification for war and deeds of violence. But that they do not fit into Jesus' teachings, especially if they are given a literal interpretation, we shall soon see.

Take the case of driving the money-changers out of the temple. That Jesus was stirred to the very depths of his being with indignation is certain, but that he actually used a whip on the backs of human beings is not so certain. It is interesting to note that in the Gospel of Matthew (21:12) and in the Gospel of Luke (19:45) neither the whip nor

the cattle are mentioned. But in John's account (2: 15) both the whip and the cattle are mentioned and the implication is that the whip was made for, and used only on, the cattle. Those money-changers were afraid of *him,* of his message, of his spirit, and not of a little physical whip which might inflict a few painful wounds upon their backs. Surely this passage cannot be used in any sense to support the use of physical force or the war system. It is a clear example of moral force.

Nor is there much satisfaction in taking the passage where Jesus in the night of his betrayal tells the disciples to buy some swords. *The New Commentary on Holy Scripture* (Gore, p. 236) says that this passage must be interpreted as ironical. It continues: "If our Lord had really intended the disciples, now to be deprived of his protection, to arm themselves in self-defense, two swords would have been of no use. He must have known that Peter and another had armed themselves with swords, and, after reminding them how Providence had supplied their needs in the past without any preparation on their part, he must have gone on ironically to suggest that now perhaps they had better equip and arm themselves, and when he was told of the two swords, have said, still ironically, 'That is enough.'" At least we know that Jesus forbade Peter to actually *use* the sword; he even healed the wound inflicted by the sword. Moreover, he said: "Put up again thy sword into his place: for all they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword." And how true it is!

We have yet to deal with the saying of Jesus, "I have not come to send peace but a sword." This certainly does not sound very peaceful, and it surely is not. Jesus did come to send the sword—not a physical sword—but persecution, strife and suffering at the hands of those who use the sword. When this verse is read in its context, which is the account of the trials and persecutions which are to be, this symbolic

interpretation of the word "sword" is verified. Here Jesus was saying: My way will cause a lot of trouble, for I bring not safety, but danger. My way will result in divisions, for I bring not ease, but adventure. My gospel will cause many to suffer, for I bring not quiet, but agitation. My message will set the world upside down, for I bring not conformity, but revolution. . . This is the correct interpretation of the sword passage, and it has been true to Christian experience from the first century even down to the twentieth. The true Christian way has always, and, for a long time yet, will cause trouble. But the Christians are not to *cause* trouble, but to suffer it if it comes in the course of Christian duty. As Dr. H. H. Wendt says in his *Teachings of Jesus* (p. 357) "the fact that His Messianic work would awaken such an embittered conflict, whilst men nevertheless supposed that it would bring them only peace and salvation, would not arise from the members of the kingdom on their part creating and fostering discord and enmity, but from their being hated and persecuted by the enemies of the kingdom of God on account of the gospel of the kingdom which they professed, followed, and preached."

Just as long as evil remains in the world so long will the true Christian be subject to abuse and persecution. There will be, for some while yet, a conflict between the higher and the lower ways of life; between the right and the wrong; between goodness and evil. In such conflicts the Christian will not only suffer by the sword, but is liable, because of his high thoughts and noble deeds, because of his desire for justice and the relief of the needy, to increase the use of the sword. In fact, the Christian's very life will contain a "sword of the Spirit"; a sword which will be used in opposition to hypocrisy, graft, economic exploitation of the weak, and all kinds of planned sin. And wherever there is a true Christian, there is a place of tension; there is a place of crisis. The true Christian will always be loved by those who

desire truth, justice and righteousness; he will be hated by those who follow after lies, injustice and iniquity. When the Christian speaks out boldly against the war system will he not be opposed by those who profit by war? When the Christian stands for internationalism, for brotherhood, for interdenominationalism, will he not be opposed by those who cannot see beyond the boundaries of their own nation or class or race or sect, by those who have greed, selfishness, blindness to truth and love, in their hearts? Yes indeed, the Christian will always have his enemies—at least until the kingdom is realized—but he will never be an enemy! He will be bigger than his enemies; he will love them.

IV

"I bring not peace, but a sword." This suggests that no Christian should sit back at ease in Zion while the world is being run to death by the devil. Like Paul, he must be up and busy, wearing not the armour of Mars, but the whole armour of God. And what is this so-called armour of God? Paul gives the answer:

> "Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places.
>
> "Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to withstand in that evil day, and, having done all, to stand. Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of righteousness; and your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace . . . taking the shield of faith. . . Take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit."

Here is, if we must use the analogy of the Christian soldier, the true soldier of Christ. He will be far different from the soldiers of the world; he will look different, act different and be different. He will strive for peace, for brotherhood, for righteousness; he will stand bravely for his principles, but he will never slay his foes. It will be his

object to save them, not destroy them. The time has come when true ministers of Christ must speak the truth and take the consequences. But are we prepared to take the consequences? That is a question which every preacher today is forced to answer.

"I come not to bring peace, but a sword." So it would seem! We therefore should not be surprised to find opposition to the cause of Christ; we should not wonder when people of the world hate us for the good we do and say. It has to be so. Every great cause has to be nurtured to full bloom by the sacrifice of many noble lives. Every follower of Christ must bear many burdens: for he takes the way of the cross. But it is by this very vicarious suffering that the kingdom of God is built, both by man and God.

Therefore if we ministers have no burdens these days, no struggles, no pains, we should reexamine our Christian lives. If we find that all men are speaking well of us, we had better examine our Christian conduct and zeal. There must be something the matter!

We should not, by any means, strive to stir up strife, but if opposition comes in the course of our Christian loyalty we should rejoice, for great will be our place and reward in the kingdom of heaven. What we should worry about is not that evil and ignorant men oppose us, but that we may not be Christian enough to warrant any opposition. When we become indifferent to the principles of Jesus and pass by unnoticed by the vicious men of the world then, truly, we have just cause for anxiety—for we may discover that we are outside the kingdom of God. Evil men may destroy our bodies, but may they never be able to destroy our souls! Preachers must not only have a great deal of patience; they must be very brave. Preachers must deal with men, but obey God: that requires not only a friendly spirit and much love, but also the conviction that the ways of God are right and will, in the end, win out.

BOOK REVIEWS

Contemporary American Literature and Religion. Halford E. Luccock. Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Company. 1934. Pp. 300. $2.00.

This book undertakes to plough a twenty-five-acre field in a day. Consequently, some rather sizable spots are left unturned, a few of the furrows are not absolutely straight and several are a little too far apart!

The volume is in the manner of several recent books, such as Allen's *Only Yesterday,* which are a retrospective, and consequently a perspective, view at "the end of an era." (That we are beginning a new era in literature seems unquestionable.) The author's thesis is somewhat accurately presented on page 14 (slightly misquoted on the jacket):

> The competent novelist of any period is an indispensable diagnostician for anyone who would seek to heal the hurt of humanity. We can learn far more of the soul of nineteenth-century England from Charles Dickens than from John Henry Newman. We can learn more, to take an extreme example, of the sickness of soul of New York City from Michael Gold's *Jews Without Money* than from all the reports of the Federation of Churches published in the last thirty years. If more religious leaders had had the wisdom to see life through the eyes of dramatists and novelists, and had not exhausted so much of their spiritual energies in denunciation, they would have felt more deeply and known more accurately the sickness they desired to heal.

With such a sweeping statement this reviewer finds himself in disagreement. Even the excellent work done by Doctor Luccock has not quite proved that point! Literature is a reflection of an age, that is true; but it is a focused reflection, a portrait rather than a photograph, to use a cliché. Does the author really mean—do the publishers believe that he means—"That the man who would really understand the spiritual problems of modern life can do no better than read . . . Theodore Dreiser, . . James Joyce, . . Joseph Wood Krutch, . . H. L. Mencken, Ogden Nash . . ."? We think that is purely publisher's blurb! It belongs properly on the "front strip."

The subject is too lengthy for a review, and besides, the book has merits not to be overlooked in our disagreement with the too-great claims made for it.

Its plan is a presentation of the subject by topics, rather than by authors. Study and criticism are in terms of eras, moods, tempers and trends, rather than by authors, books and decades. This is a classification that necessarily leads to repetitions for some authors. Thus, Eugene

O'Neill is discussed as a prophet of disillusionment and futility, as well as the author of *Lazarus Laughed,* a drama "marked by spiritual sensitivity and deep insight, such as his portrayal of the fate of one who carries the spirit of Christ to a world not yet prepared for it" (p. 288). Theodore Dreiser as a post-war realist "presents probably the most thorough-going mechanistic, naturalistic point of view of any modern American writer" (p. 63); but in his examination of the social and economic scene, "there is pity and sympathy" (p. 175). The reader soon becomes accustomed to a phrase he grows to approve, "this does not do justice to. . ."

Almost all the author's prose quotations are from novels. Why the absence of a vast literature of prose essays and criticisms? (Chapter 10 is inadequate.) Other omissions are obvious. There is too little attention to biography, only pages 255-257. The great mystery story vogue of our generation is not even mentioned. Is it not significant? The short story is omitted, yet in the hands of a Wilbur Daniel Steel, or an F. Scott Fitzgerald, or an Irvin S. Cobb or a host of others, it becomes an important literary feather to show which way the religious wind is blowing. Can the recently deceased Gamaliel Bradford, one of the great figures in our present-day literature, be dismissed with one poem? (P. 276.)

Every reader will feel that some special interest of his receives inadequate attention; the scope of the book is too broad to expect otherwise. Along the main highways that the author has chosen to travel he has admirably pointed out the significant features of the literary terrain. It somewhat chastens us of our too glib and even boisterous allegiance to writers and moods we see the better now for the collyrium of perspective.

It is a tribute to the author's sense of fairness that he does not argue his point as a clergyman at the expense of his judgment as a literateur. Thus, the position of Sinclair Lewis in *Main Street* is properly seen to have been vindicated in the Lynds' *Middletown;* for all our assurance that Mencken is the devil's vicar-general, "any audit of his services to his time must include achievements of far-reaching social and spiritual value" (p. 250 and note the entire paragraph); humanism is primarily a literary movement and only secondarily a religious one.

No one can write of Doctor Luccock without pointing out his remarkable ability to produce phrases that truly merit the otherwise often abused characteristic—epigrammatic luster. Examples are numerous:

Edgar Lee Masters *put arsenic in the "Old Oaken Bucket"* (p. 83).

Most of the "bad" morals taught by the drama have come from the "good" plays (p. 123).

In the frantic revolt to get away from the drawing-room, many have bolted clear out to the pig pen (p. 164).

The book-blurbs on bright jackets *are simply themes by the awkward squad of the Freshman class* (p. 178).

Like muddy water, the war wind takes time to clear (p. 188).

Mencken struck his mighty tuning-fork and sounded the pitch for a great Anvil Chorus. . . (p. 209).

This same Mencken *"is the American Punch and Judy Show"* (p. 251).

This is a book that every preacher should have and every student of American literature will have!

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON.

Ethics and Moral Tolerance. ARTHUR KENYON ROGERS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. 323. $2.50.

AT a time when moral standards and authoritative absolutes are falling into disrepute and cosmopolitanism is the order of the day, this volume, like many others, appears as an attempt to answer the challenge of a morally distracted world. *Ethics and Moral Tolerance* is a treatise on moral judgment from the standpoint of a diluted idealism. It criticizes amoralism with its promiscuous moral freedom, new realism with its logical bias, and pragmatism's slavery to method and its too easy dismissal of ethical content. The volume pleads for the maintenance of moral standards—not as fixed absolutes or rules of conduct but as progressive rational principles or ideals of moral action.

The author makes a case of moral tolerance without the sacrificing of moral principles, stressing the fact that tolerance by no means obviates the necessity of critically judging the conduct of our fellow men. The essential element in moral judgments is emotional approval or disapproval, whose basis is to be found in the realm of the sentiments rather than in the intellective process. This does not mean, however, that morality is individual, subjective, arbitrary and divorced from objective reality. Our wishes, interests and approvals are causative factors in experience. Sentiments determine values. Goodness is synthetic, that alone being "good" towards which we can adopt an approving attitude. We are under obligation to pass judgment upon the conduct of others, and our standards of judgment reside in the moral sentiments. The author postulates a "generic human nature" which lends encouragement to the task of moral suasion. We may apply our moral standards to the actions of others, because they possess the capacity to share our sentiments, and to pass judgments, similar to our own, upon the conduct of their fellows.

This volume, whose author is well known in the field of philosophy,

is a thoughtful presentation of a challenging theme. It contains much sound wisdom on the general subject of moral tolerance; but the book is open to most of the criticisms made against the psychological approach to ethical theory. We are always disappointed when we look in vain for an index.

R. C. BENSEN.

McMASTER UNIVERSITY.

The Chinese: Their History and Culture. KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Two volumes. Pp. xiv, 506, and 389. $7.50.

THE author has become an authority on Chinese and Japanese history and culture. In recognition of his special attainments in his field, in 1923 he was chosen D. Willis James Professor of Missions and Oriental History at Yale University, and during the intervening years has had opportunity for research through travel and books to acquire material, and through lecture-room method to acquire also the art of sifting and selection and clear and direct speech. To discuss with adequate sense of proportion a civilization extending over more than three thousand years requires unusual skill. The author indulges in little speculation concerning origins but gives account of facts supported by the best Sinologists. The chapter entitled, "The beginnings of Chinese Civilization (to 221 B. C.)," is a model for historians of any civilization. The chapters that follow unfold a story as entrancing as romance. Unfamiliar names of conquerors, administrators, reformers, philosophers, poets, historians, artists, represent achievements comparable to those represented by names familiar to readers of occidental peoples. It is due to the vicissitudes of history that our text-books make us acquainted with Persian and Greek and Roman cultures, rather than Indian and Chinese. Fortunately, modern civilization has discovered the literatures of the Far East, and is experiencing an intellectual stimulus somewhat analogous to that experienced by Europe on the discovery of the Greek and Roman classics.

Hitherto English-speaking readers had to depend on the well-known work of Samuel Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom,* revised in 1883, for authentic information and sympathetic interpretation. But fifty years of additional research and more intimate international relationships have made another history necessary. In all probability Professor Latourette's two volumes will also serve two generations of readers. Then, too, during the author's own lifetime historic events have occurred in China, due to contact with Christianity. In this specifically religious phase of Chinese culture he has unusual qualifications. Christianity is as much a fact in

China today as was Buddhism a hundred years after its introduction. How Buddhism and Taoism and Confucianism interpreted each other is fairly well known. Christianity has been equally effective in affecting the sentiments and practices and ideals of millions of the population. The author has been witness of change of climate, so to speak, by the preaching of Christian missions.

In brief, this two-volume work should be within reach of any desiring authentic and readable information. An extensive but selected bibliography at the end of each chapter adds to its value, and a minute index makes any subject treated easily found. The attractive workmanship of the publishers is tribute to the literary quality of the contents.

MILTON G. EVANS.

The Conquest of a Continent. MADISON GRANT. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1933. Pp. 377. $3.00.

THE title is misleading. One expects another story of the heroism and courage of early settlers, and the means by which the white race swept westward over the American plains building a new nation. There is, in truth, something of pleasure in finding that this is a new sort of story concerning this last great migration of the peoples of the world.

For the first time in adequate form we have traced for us the movement and settlement of the various nationalities in the new continent. Beginning far back with the movement of races in Europe, we have graphically described their passing to America and the sections of their final destination. First were the English, then the Scots and Ulster Scots—a term the author prefers to Scotch-Irish—and the Irish. Later came those from the Continent of Europe, those from the southern nations settling in the cities and those from the north upon the land. "The compelling motive" of all, we are told, "who crossed the ocean to America from earliest Colonial times down to 1880 was land hunger." And with this one must agree.

In this respect the story is well told. There is a keen analysis of the purposes and ideals of individuals and groups who have made their homes in the new land, as well as in some degree of their achievements. And as a sociological study of the spread of races and culture over America it will prove most valuable.

But here again one must enter a protest against the misleading title. The book is in reality propaganda of the one-hundred-per-cent. Americans, the cheer-leaders of the good old Nordic race. With very thinly veiled motive the book is a treatise proving the superiority of that race above all others and the only one whose members have made any con-

tribution to America, or have achieved anything of worth. One thinks of a Caruso, Strauss, Morgenthau, Rosenwald, and a multiude of other names.

Anyone who thinks in terms of race value—even race justice—is a sentimentalist. Professor Henry Fairfield Osborn in his Introduction to the book states his own position thus:

> I strongly object to the assumption that one race is "superior" or "inferior" to another, just as I object to the assumption that all races are alike or even equal. Such assumptions are wholly unwarranted by fact.

These are relative terms, he says: "Around the equator the black races . . . are 'superior' to the white races. . ." Any student would agree with this. But the whole tenor of the book is the opposite. Progress (whatever that is), creative genius, mastery of one's environment—so far as America is concerned, rests with the Nordic race.

Speaking of the Negroes Mr. Grant writes:

> But evidence does exist to show that the intelligence and ability of a colored person are in pretty direct proportion to the amount of white blood he has, and that most of the positions of leadership, influence, and prominence in the Negro race are held not by real Negroes but by Mulattoes, many of whom have very little Negro blood."

And so we are not surprised to find that the author is inclined to regret the passing of slavery.

He deplores the fact that a "so-called liberal point of view is so short-sighted that we have in our midst today organizations and groups who, with the best intentions, are encouraging the Negro within and the black, brown, and yellow men without, to dispute the dominance over the world at large of Christian Europeans and Americans." Christian missionaries are chiefly to blame for this "sentimental sympathy for other races of mankind." But, "the racially suicidal result of all this is the undermining of the control of the Nordic races over the natives."

Hurrah! then, for God's own children, the good old Nordics. Up with the fiery cross! Every Ku-Klux Klanner will rejoice in the book. And every one-hundred-percenter will make it his Bible.

R. E. E. Harkness.

Les deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion. Henri Bergson. Paris: Felix Alcan. 5e Edition. 1933. Pp. 346. 25 francs.

This book may be regarded as the capstone of a philosophy whose importance has been growing for the last fifty years. It is a work which has

been long awaited, since before its appearance M. Bergson had written no systematic exposition of his views on morality and religion.

An important distinction is made at the outset, a distinction which lies at the very foundation of the system—the distinction between *societé close* and *societé ouverte*. A closed society is one in which the individual conceives of himself as closely related only to the particular society of which he is a part. This type is best exemplified in the family and in the clan or nation. This is the society ordained by nature as that which man would instinctively form. He belongs to it and is inseparable from it, whether he will or no. In order for him to live in such a social group, certain rules are impingent upon all, without the enforcement of which the society would disintegrate. These rules may vary from society to society and from age to age, but there are always rules, which insure the solidarity and the perpetuation of the group as a whole. The sanction by which these rules receive their obligatory force is social pressure, no more and no less; and the whole of these rules constitutes what Bergson calls the *morale close* of a *societé close,* the closed morality of a closed society, a morality of obligation. Now, as over against this closed society there is a *societé ouverte,* wherein the individual is conceived, not as a member of a family, clan or nation, but as a part of humanity as a whole. The difference between the two is not a difference of quantity or magnitude, but a difference in quality or kind. They are totally different, arising from different sources. The theory that the evolution of human thought has proceeded from the concept of the individual to that of the family, thence to that of the nation and finally to that of humanity is true of the first three, but is totally untrue of the last.

The interval in the transition from the concept of nation to that of humanity as a whole is an interval far too great to admit of any similarity thereof to the more elementary transitions. To repeat, the difference between the "closed society" and the "opened society" is a difference in kind, and the difference extends clear to the sources of the two. *La Societé close* has its root in nature and is revealed to us in the natural order. *La Societé ouverte,* on the other hand, is never found in nature, but has been revealed to us by great personalities whose message to men has been illuminated by the light of genius. It is they who have transcended narrow racial and national barriers, while the fire of their genius has burned, and have proclaimed the universal brotherhood of man. Living in closed societies with closed moralities, they have proclaimed an opened society with a *morale ouverte,* a morality which has as its vital force, not the social pressure of a closed morality, but individual aspiration. So great has been their appeal, so convincing their message, that they

have captured the enthusiasm of their hearers to the point that they became disciples, not only with the motive of bringing to their consummation the teachings of their master, but with the additional motive of emulation of the personality of the master himself. This, then, is the difference between the *morale close* and the *morale ouverte:* the one has as its source nature itself; the other has as its source the personality of a genius. The one obtains in a *societé close,* the other in a *societé ouverte.* The one is a morality of pressure and obligation, the other is a morality of emulation and aspiration. The one preaches a gospel of fraternity, the other, a gospel of universal love. The one is infra-intellectual, bordering closely on the instinctive; the other is supra-intellectual, somewhat nearly approximating the divine. And between the two lies the intellect of the individual in society, which must act as mediary between the two, integrating the highest values of both and striving, by the rational direction of volition, to make this integrated morality effective in society. It is thus and only thus that a constant evolution of morality can be achieved.

Thus far the argument has been given in detail. The author deals with religion in a similar fashion. Religion has taken two forms, *religion statique* and *religion dynamique.* The facts of life have faced man with all of their striking reality. Life has seemed to him to be inevitably mechanistic and final, when interpreted according to the dictates of the intellect. But the *élan vital,* the vital force within him, has forced him to repudiate this interpretation, and, by means of the *function fabulatrice,* to interpret life in a way essentially religious. Religion, then, from this point of view, is "a defense reaction of nature against the dissolving power of intelligence" (p. 127). The first function of a *religion statique* is social conservation. The primitive god is a vengeful, regulative god, which assures against disorganization. Its second function is the re-establishing, intellectually, of life's equilibrium—the intellect against the intellect. Thus, when man confronts death, religion sets forth immortality as a defense reaction against the representation by the intellect of the inevitability of death. This static religion, which is primitive, sees in the forces of nature the elements of personality; but it remains for a higher type of religion to conceive of a God in whom all the elements of personality are integrated to form a unified whole. This other, finer religion M. Bergson terms a "*religion dynamique.*" The two are totally different, and yet they are one; for "religion is a mixed thing: a new orientation of the old, an aspiration of the old god, a product of the *function fabulatrice,* to lose itself in that which is revealed, illumined and revived in the presence of privileged souls" (p. 229). This new dynamic religion has been revealed by the great mystics of the world. And the

greatest of these have been the Christian mystics. The Greek mysteries possessed nothing of mysticism but an abstract veneration for a great personality. The mysticism of Plotinus is more nearly genuine, but his refusal to let contemplation be swallowed up in action rendered him a false proponent of true mysticism. The same is true of oriental mysticism. We see, then, that M. Bergson confines mysticism within strict bounds: it is "the making of contact, and thus a partial coincidence, with the creative effort which manifests life" (p. 235). And it is thus that the truly great Christian mystics, e. g., Paul, Catherine of Sienna, Joan of Arc, Francis of Assisi, have achieved a true mysticism. And if this be true, they themselves are essentially imitators and emulators of that which found its fullest consummation in the Christ of the Gospels. To him and to all mystics, "God is an energy without assignable bounds, a power of creating and loving which transcends all imagination" (p. 281); and it is the sole object of the mystic to become one with this *élan vital*, to make its force felt, and "to complete, with the aid of God, the creation of the human species and to make of humanity that which it would have been could it have been formed without the aid of man himself" (p. 251).

In the final chapter practical application of the system is attempted. That the civilized world is an aggregation of closed societies is undeniable. Recent attempts, such as the League of Nations, toward the development of an international consciousness are heartening. But they fail, and will continue to fail, as long as they employ the instruments of the closed society to effectuate the actuality of an open society. War can never be outlawed by policing the nations, and international arbitration can never be effective as long as the threat of concerted armed enforcement serves as the underlying sanction. Let such international bodies rather take up the problems which are the underlying causes of modern war, viz., unevenly distributed populations, unequally adequate natural resources, and so forth, and let these problems be adequately solved. Thus and thus only can the brotherhood of man be made a thing of reality and a true *societé ouverte* be made effective.

EUGENE M. AUSTIN.

The Suffering God. C. S. PAUL, M. A. Madras: The Christian Literature Society for India. 1932. Pp. xiii, 261. Re. 1-8.

The Word of the Cross to Hindus. EDGAR W. THOMPSON. London: Epworth Press (Edgar C. Barton). 1933. Pp. ix, 328. 7s, 6d.

THE problem of the best method of presenting the Christian message to the people of India is engaging the attention of thoughtful nationals and

missionaries. The two books under notice and Mr. V. Chakkarai's book, *The Cross and Indian Thought* are fine examples of the kind of thinking that is resulting in fruitful contributions to one particular phase of the gospel, that which is concerned with the doctrine of the atonement. All three books are creative and are more concerned with the experiential results than the formal aspects of salvation.

The Suffering God is written by one of a fine group of Indian Christian young men who move freely in the field of philosophical thought, and are able to use it to advantage for the presentation of Christianity to their fellow countrymen. Professor Paul has made a thoughtful study of the systems of Indian philosophy as well as of the philosophy of theism, and shows their bearing on one another. By a careful argument he shows that the God in whom one can believe in a moral universe must be one who leaves freedom to men, that freedom which has been misused, resulting in sin. But since this is a closely articulated universe salvation can only be the outcome of God and man working together. That means that God must enter vitally human experience. The wrong of man results in the suffering of God because God cares. The Cross is the point in history where that suffering has expressed itself most clearly and adequately. " The Cross is rightly described as the enacting in time and space of an act that is eternally true of God . . . in the crucified Jesus we see the heart of the Eternal which counts no cost too great for the redemption of souls." A large section of the book is devoted to Hindu objections which are met in a fine spirit of appreciative criticism.

The Word of the Cross to Hindus is the work of a man who was twenty-five years a missionary and for fourteen years has been secretary of the Wesleyan Missionary Society of Great Britain. Very much akin to Mr. Paul, Mr. Thompson interprets the Cross as the result of the suffering love of God. He also considers this message with reference to Hindu thought, the emphasis here being on religious rather than philosophical doctrines. He discovers certain issues on which the Christian has to part company with the Hindu, and the Christian preacher to be effective must understand differences as well as similarities in message. Again the books are alike in avoiding any theoretical interpretation of the suffering of Christ to be elevated into a dogma. They are more concerned with the emancipation that should come to life through following Jesus and his way of life.

A. Stewart Woodburne.

Jesus the Unknown. D. S. Merejkowski. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1934. Pp. 445. $2.75.

This is the strangest of books; unlike most books that are written about Jesus. The scholar will find much in it with which to agree, and much with which to disagree. After reading it through one is not quite sure what is historical and what fictional.

It is a good deal like a piece of fine-spun fabric, with all kinds of textures and colors blended into a strange design—and it is unmistakably foreign, as though it had come from some far-off shore.

And indeed it has. The most dominant note in the book is one of mysticism. Merejkowski is a Russian, and a mystic. And it is the subtle mysticism of the book which grips one, and yet leaves one wondering if he has been deceived. It is well characterized by a sentence from page 211—"Do not the first words of the Lord sound unbearably harsh, words of love impregnated with hatred? Undoubtedly they do, and therefore they are authentic, *because it is a law of gospel criticism that the more incredible a thing, the more authentic it is.*"

Here you have the key to Merejkowski's method. To see this in high-gear working order, you will have to read his story of the birth of Jesus, especially that marvelous piece of mysticism in which the author has portrayed the coming of the Holy Spirit upon the Virgin Mary.

The danger of such a book is that the Gospel story and the author's story are running side by side, and if one is not careful one may take Russian mysticism for gospel truth. This is so apparent in the description of the temptation that it invokes caution. That Jesus passed through some of the experiences recounted in this book is just too much to believe. And yet there are many beautiful and uplifting passages which make the book most charming reading and most spiritual in its final influence.

It is a volume well worth reading, which adds nothing to critical scholarship, and will be definitely tantalizing to literalists. Perhaps only a poet could fully find enjoyment in its reading.

Another volume is to follow on the revealed life, death and resurrection. One is curious to know what Merejkowski will do with the historic record. He has certainly played tricks with the hidden years.

George F. Finnie.

Living Issues in the New Testament. C. A. Anderson Scott, D. D., Cantab., Hon. D. D., Aber. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1933. Pp. xii, 192. $1.75.

This is one of those rare books which approaches the problems of the New Testament with scholarly skill, and, at the same time, has in it a

spiritual power which uplifts the reader; it challenges the heart while appealing to the reason.

The author, in his preface, makes use of a device which might be adopted by other writers with profit; he gives a brief statement of his main conclusions as a guide to his readers.

The first issue considered is as to Paul's competency to bear testimony concerning the history of Jesus. The writer discusses the possibility that Paul may have actually seen Jesus at Jerusalem, and presents the evidence as to Paul's knowledge of our Lord's earthly life, teachings, and ethical demands. In this way he supports his thesis that Paul is a "first-rate authority" with regard to the life and character of Jesus.

The next issue raised is between atonement and reconciliation. Here the author makes bold to say, "There is no reason to believe that Paul held or taught a penal or propitiary theory of the atonement," rather, he looked upon the death of Jesus as a voluntary offering of himself "for our advantage" and "in connection with our sins." It was "an act of obedience," a sacrifice corresponding to that of the "Paschal Lamb." Through it "God established once for all the otherwise incredible fact of his love for sinful men and offered reconciliation with himself to all such as believe on Christ."

Paul's doctrine of salvation raises the issue as to the mystical factor involved. Mysticism, to the writer, stands for a "response of the soul to the approach of God," the agent for producing which is the "Word," regarded as "the vehicle of personality or will," and equated with "Christ," "Holy Spirit" and "Church." The proclamation of the gospel "evoked faith" which to Paul was not merely "intellectual assent," but "the human response to God in Christ." This "'saving faith' creates the mystical relationship," and "becomes the channel for the continuous self-communication of God."

Two chapters are given to "The Riddle of the Fourth Gospel." The center of this Gospel is seen to be "life," which is defined as "the perfect realization of self." Christ gives this life to the believer "by the communication of himself. But this was also a communication of God. For Jesus was the Logos, and the Logos or Word was just the self-communicating activity of God. He was that divine 'Word of God' made flesh." To John the presence of the Spirit is equivalent to the presence of Jesus and guides us into the "whole of reality."

The final chapter considers the question "What think ye of Christ?" People were led to him by the effect of his personality in producing joy and peace and hope. Such values were found in him that the Christians

of the second century began to call him God although he is nowhere given that name in the New Testament, where he is often acknowledged as Lord.

The author doubts whether we have the "right to insist, or even to allow the impression to continue, that assent to the proposition, 'Christ is God' is an essential part of vital Christianity." Yet he feels that the individual Christian cannot stop with the acknowledgment of Christ as Lord. He finds himself compelled to say "He is God for me."

Doctor Scott is a distinguished English scholar, teacher and writer. This year he celebrates his seventy-fifth birthday. His book presents the fruit of his ripe scholarship and experience.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER.

Our Children: A Handbook for Parents. DOROTHY CANFIELD FISHER and SIDONIE MATSNER GRUENBERG, Editors. New York: The Viking Press. 1933. Pp. ix, 348. $2.75.

PERIODICALLY the Child Study Association of America prepares and sponsors a reading text for its large constituency of parents. This volume is the latest presentation. The editors have drawn upon the services of men and women who qualify as specialists in their respective fields. The materials are based, for the most part, upon research work; they are presented "for the lay reader but without oversimplification and without partisan leanings." The contributors concern themselves with four general themes: the child's growth and development, the child at home, the child at school, and the child in the outside world. Within this range of interest more than a score of subjects are treated including such themes as "discipline—old and new," "angers and fears as assets," "sex education," "the problem of going to college," "in quest of life values in a machine age," and "religion and the child's life." The reader will find provocative subject-matter which treats such difficult problems as, "How can a child be taught to control his temper?", "What determines whether a child should be given musical training?", "How can we avoid spoiling a convalescing child?", "Can we expect young children to be obedient?", "How can we develop independence and responsibility in children when they still need security and protection?", and "How can parents maintain standards and ideals without seeming 'old-fashioned' to their children?"

It would be difficult to find a handbook for parents with more uniformly superior articles of study. Every writer has taken his task seriously and has condensed in brief form a wealth of information concerning the subject in hand. He has added a list of reference books to furnish guidance for further studies. It is possible that the editors have

given undue emphasis to health features and neglected somewhat the several phases of character education. Besides, certain primary forces affecting child life "in the outside world" are overlooked.

Despite the hard times the book has already been reprinted three times, testifying to its popularity among inquiring parents. Dorothy Canfield Fisher is president of the American Association for Adult Education and Mrs. Gruenberg is director of the Child Study Association of America.

STEWART G. COLE.

This World and the Next: The Working Philosophy of an Average Man, by an Average Man, for the Average Man. ELLERY H. CLARK. Boston: The Stratford Company. 1934. Pp. 245. $2.00.

THIS book is one of those which, in substance though not in form, is autobiographical. The author is both an A. B. and LL. B. of Harvard University, and a member of the Massachusetts Bar, with a gift at the same time for writing in a popular style, which moreover is based upon wide reading in the field which he treats. Still more important for understanding this book, Mrs. Clark was early afflicted with an incurable disease, in spite of which, and in the conscious presence of which, she remained, as the preface to the book states, a person "of arresting vitality and radiant buoyancy of spirit." Mr. Clark had passed through an experience of religious doubt, in which he had given attention to the serious question of religion in general and to the question of immortality in particular. As an outcome, his "philosophy of life is essentially religious. And regarding Jesus Christ, not necessarily as divine, but as one of the great religious leaders of all time, my philosophy of life is much concerned with His life and teachings" (page ix). From such a background there emerges a very readable review of the questions which naturally arise as the subject of a future life is considered. Throughout, the author insists, as he emphasizes on page 39 for example, that he "will *not* dogmatize," and this assurance is continually kept in mind, as he describes how those of Christian belief experience a life of happiness, as compared with the experience of agnostics, who are "not-so-happy," and the experience of atheists, whom he finds to be "gloomy." He closes the volume with a short chapter on the religion of the future, and another under the title "The One Thing Needful," to which is added an Epilogue, in which he states that the book was begun "merely as a theoretical study of the question of Immortality," with little expectation that prior to its completion the death of his wife would have occurred, in view of which, with a new revelation of the meaning of her life and the friendships it had

brought he had become impressed with the philosophy of life indicated in the language quoted above. That the book is an unusual one, even though it treats a subject on which so much has been written, is easily seen from this brief review of what seems to the reviewer to be its special characteristics, and it will be read, not only with interest but with satisfaction and with much religious aid by the large number of those who are interested in the problem of immortality.

FRANK GRANT LEWIS.

Reflections on the End of an Era. REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1934. Pp. 302. $2.00.

THE reviewer is naturally attracted by the word "end" in the title of this book, and, in the case of the present reviewer, he is not so certain after examining the pages of the volume that the conditions in which we live, even as sketched in brilliant fashion by Professor Niebuhr, warrant the use of that term as descriptive of our period. Some decades farther along those who look back to the early part of the twentieth century may be better able to decide that question. Nevertheless these Reflections are distinctly interesting and presented in a graphic style which only an author like Professor Niebuhr commands, and the work will be read with satisfaction and with real profit accordingly.

If the substance of the work, or at least the point of view, is to be found in a single statement the following from the Preface may serve that purpose:

> In my opinion adequate spiritual guidance can come only through a more radical political orientation and more conservative religious convictions than are comprehended in the culture of our era.

The development of that idea, or probably one ought to say those two ideas, is pictured through twenty chapters, which are essentially twenty separate essays on political and religious conditions without any obvious sequential development of a thesis into treatise form. To be sure, Professor Niebuhr does not propose a treatise but only reflections on political and religious conditions as he sees these, and the volume is doubtless more interesting, and possibly more useful, in view of that.

As Professor Niebuhr is a religious leader, his work is to be considered particularly from the point of view of its religious significance, and the title of the last chapter, "The Assurance of Grace," is suggestive and important. Taken with the quotation from the Preface above, this reveals how Professor Niebuhr looks to a more conservative attitude in religion than the present seems to forecast, and to a dependence upon this

conservative religious attitude as a means of enduring life as it is, rather than to an expectation of world betterment through religious evolution in the direction of liberal theological views.

Particularly in view of the essay character of the volume, the author is to be congratulated on providing a useful index, and readers who wish to go back to details of the discussion, as many certainly will, are thus aided in a very helpful way.

FRANK GRANT LEWIS.

Beyond Fundamentalism and Modernism. The Gospel of God. GEORGE W. RICHARDS, D. D., LL. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1934. Pp. xiv, 333. $2.00.

PRESIDENT RICHARDS of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church at Lancaster, Pa., is well known to students of theology and of church history. He is one of the ablest interpreters of Barth to American readers. His years of training in German universities, his exegetical and historical equipment, and his experience as pastor and teacher, make it rather easy for him to translate technical theological language into the vernacular of laymen.

The author's interest is not in fundamentalism nor in modernism, but in the gospel of God, and he is profoundly interested in it. He writes with conviction and strength. He is a theist without apology. In thorough-going fashion he states the traditional theological doctrines, and so maintains the virtues of fundamentalism without being a "fundamentalist." Indebted to scholarship both historical and philosophical, he lives in the modern world without being a "modernist." Although he probably will rejoice in being enrolled among the modernists against whom Pope Pius X in 1907 issued his famous encyclical, *Pascendi Gregis*. It has been unfortunate that fundamentalism and modernism have been coined as antonyms, when the first word describes the content of belief and the second the spirit and method of inquiry. If modernism describes content, then the word "Beyond" in the title is justified; if it describes spirit and method, there is no beyond, but an ever-present Reality in experience.

President Richards' discussion of the gospel of God illustrates well in a single mind the blending of traditionalism and rationalism and mysticism. He is mystic because Christian; he is traditionalist because of appeal to Scripture; he is rationalist because he interprets. Reason is at work all the while, but intellect is aglow with gratitude for the past in social history and for the grace of a sovereign God in his own personal history. He emphasizes a neglected theme in these self-sufficient days,

the grace of God in human salvation. This is the gospel beyond present-day fundamentalism, and beyond the power of modernism to dislodge from him who has experienced it.

Beyond Fundamentalism and Modernism is a volume that will render invaluable service to any reader.

MILTON G. EVANS.

East and West in Religion. SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., and New York: The Macmillan Company. 1933. Pp. 146. $1.90.

THIS little volume is a collection of addresses and sermons by the well-known Indian philosopher. No living scholar is rendering more distinguished service than Sir S. Radhakrishnan in interpreting the best thought of East and West, each to the other. The present volume of addresses is another evidence of his unusual capacity in that direction. That is particularly true of the second lecture which gives the caption to the book.

The Western mind is described as rationalistic and ethical, positivist and practical, while the Eastern mind is more inclined to inward life and intuitive thinking. The West demands clearness and shies at mystery, while the East believes there are realities which cannot be clearly seen nor logically demonstrated. Religion in the West is intellectual and is anxious for definition, whereas in the East it is more the life of the Spirit, and has an element that lies "beyond" expression. The West has developed more of dogmatism and scholasticism, where the East is better satisfied with spiritual culture. There is a tendency to other-worldliness in Eastern religions, while this-worldliness characterizes religion in the West. Jesus and his religion were of the East; Christianity as organized is Western. Each type has its advantages and each its perils. The advantage in Western religion has been in that men seek salvation through serving others; in the East it has been stress on the inner life. The West has contributed prudence, knowledge and discipline; the East freedom, originality and courage. The peril of the West is running to regimentation; of the East it is a petrification of the spiritual in the formal. The world needs a blend of the two for the largest enrichment of life.

This is a most penetrating analysis of the outstanding features of religion—East and West. Doubtless the author would be the first to acknowledge that there are westerners in the East and easterners in the West so far as religious emphasis is concerned. Thoughtful people will heartily agree that each has a contribution to make to the other, and that human life would be immeasurably strengthened by a greater reciprocity between the two spirits in religion.

A. STEWART WOODBURNE.

The Child. MEYER F. NIMKOFF. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1934. Pp. ix, 303. $2.50.

THERE are many praiseworthy features about this book. Seldom does a schoolman pick up as readable a text for college purpose as this book is. The author has exhibited mature scholarly interests and presented a fund of highly suggestive materials concerning the sociology of the child without lapsing into an academic dialect. Time and again the reader feels that Billy is living before his very eyes and that he is in the socially diagnostic laboratory of life witnessing to his manner of acquiring a culture. Juniors in college will welcome the usable references which accompany each chapter. Rather than content himself with a listing of books, the author has offered a widely selective list and added incisive questions concerning each reference, which vitalizes the inquiry.

The title of the book and that of some of the chapter-headings may be more conventional than the contents warrant. Possibly in the first section of the book Doctor Nimkoff has resorted unduly to treatment of the child in strips rather than of the *whole* child under different circumstances. He is at his best in the second part which he calls, "Social Experience." Here he presents family, play, work, school, æsthetic and religious rôles of the developing youth in clear and forceful language and in terms of an expansive world-view. The text should prove popular in introductory courses in sociology; it will be equally welcome to intelligent parents and clergy.

Doctor Nimkoff is a member of the faculty of Bucknell University.

STEWART G. COLE.

A Handbook of Child Psychology. CARL MURCHISON, Editor. Worcester: Clark University Press. 1931. Pp. xii, 711. $5.00.

THE International University Series in Psychology, sponsored by Clark University, is a significant set of text-books. Through this medium the world's outstanding scholars make contributions. The present text considers problems of child psychology and results of scientific research with children. There are twenty-two contributors, six of whom are Europeans. Among the latter are Piaget of Geneva, Anna Freud of Vienna, and Lewin of Berlin.

This book is written for the research student. The contributors state what they consider are the most promising findings in their particular fields of inquiry, and they indicate questions pertaining to child behavior that call for further study. To each theme is appended an extensive bibliography of coordinated references. The various phases of child behavior are

included. Particular attention is devoted to physiological and emotional approaches. The social orientation of the child is by no means overlooked. There are chapters on children's morals and children's philosophies. No mention is made of children's religion. That is a pertinent subject and can now be treated apart from sectarian interests. In other words, the psychology of child religion is being studied in many circles on a scientific basis.

STEWART G. COLE.

The Meaning of Right and Wrong. RICHARD C. CABOT. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. 463. $3.50.

THE author is Professor of Social Ethics and Professor of Clinical Medicine at Harvard. His book confirms the revelation of previous writings, namely, that here is a refreshingly sane, unstilted and original thinker. He has brought in this volume the considerations of ethics down out of the clouds of vague theorizing into the realm where men live. That is no inconsiderable achievement in itself.

An interesting idea early advanced and later fully developed is that matters of right and wrong may be conceived profitably as a multitude of "agreements." One's own ethical life consists in agreements with one's own self involving elements of right and wrong. One is ethical when by keeping a given agreement he adheres to what he conceives to be right. The principle of agreements reaches out into all manner of social situations wherein right is seen in one's good faith in keeping agreements with others, either tacitly accepted or specifically cited as binding.

Agreements emerge in experience in order to guarantee the satisfaction of certain basic "needs" of individual and society, such as honesty, education, opportunity to grow, and the like. Discussion of this theme is most stimulating and rewarding to the careful reader.

One further illustration, added to the above, must serve our purpose to introduce this interesting volume, namely his discussion under "Ethical Security and Ethical Reform." Progress is made by maintaining continuity with the past, conserving the enduring from yesterday as a contribution to today and tomorrow. Progress is likened, most happily, to one who walks; one foot is planted securely on the ground while the other moves out in quest of an advanced place of safe landing, or while it goes adventuring. Any system of right and wrong must provide for reform, for new agreements, for ethical growth.

We are truly enthusiastic about *The Meaning of Right and Wrong* as a thought-fertilizer for the alert minister.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

Standards and Trends in Religious Education. HUGH HARTSHORNE, HELEN R. STEARNS, and WILLARD E. UPHAUS. New Haven: Published for the Institute of Social and Religious Research by the Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press. 1933. Pp. 221. $2.00.

THE ninth and last volume in the "Yale Studies in Religious Education" is taken up, as its title indicates, with the standards and trends in modern religious education. Like the preceding volumes, it is based on case studies, but in this case it is supplemented by statistical data regarding 746 church schools and 500 colleges.

Realizing that if the religious education of an individual is to play a real part in integrating and motivating his life, it must be a continuous process from infancy to adulthood, the authors have made a survey of the present standards of local church schools as a preliminary to a study of religious work done among college students and the response to it, in both denominational and state-supported universities.

The study suggests an answer to the frequently asked question: "Why is there not a greater interest in religion among college students?" by pointing out the inadequacy of their preparation in the church school.

As the first section, which deals with standards and trends in the church school, is studied, it becomes obvious that we have been too much concerned with the objective side of religious education. It shows that too often our emphasis has been placed upon bringing our work up to standards imposed by some outside organization, rather than on meeting specific needs of individuals in concrete situations. An optimistic note is struck, however, as attention is called to the present tendency to reverse that emphasis.

The second section, dealing with standards and trends in religious education in colleges and universities, indicates the need for a thorough revision of the aims and practices of religious educational attempts on college campuses. In the concluding chapter, suggestions are given to denominational schools which, if followed, would once more give the church college a function which could not be fulfilled by the state university as now organized. The suggestion, growing out of the study of religious work carried on in state-supported and independent universities, that there be greater cooperation among religious workers plus an effort on the part of churches to "make religious persons of the adults who are already on the faculties" points the way which would make religious and character training an inherent part of a university course.

This volume will be of interest to all who are concerned with the task of religious education in the local situation as well as in institutions of higher learning, not because it will prove satisfying, but because, through

the exposure of the inadequacy of present efforts, it will stimulate the reader to attempt to bring about a more effective method of religious education.

JOHN W. THOMAS.

Church Schools of Today. HUGH HARTSHORNE and EARLE V. EHRHART. New Haven: Published for the Institute of Social and Religious Research by the Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford; Oxford University Press. 1933. Pp. 223. $2.00.

IN this, the seventh volume of Yale Studies in Religious Education, Hartshorne and Ehrhart give a report of ten churches in ten different situations differing in location, in traditional background, and in the conception of their tasks. In this book, as in previous volumes of the same study, the reader is introduced to religious education as it is actually being carried on in churches which are progressive in that they are attempting to meet the needs of their local situations. The study has been made through groups formed in the local church for the purpose, as well as by individual observation, and conference with local church leaders.

The volume has been divided into three parts. The first gives, in some detail, a report of the study made of "Church A," a pioneering metropolitan church. It discusses the history, setting, and institutional features of the school under the captions:

1. The Social and Historical Background.
2. The Relation of the School to the Community.
3. The Relation of the School to the Home.
4. The Leadership.
5. The Pupils.
6. Costs and Wastes.

It then turns to a consideration of the functions and activities of the members under the headings:

7. The School as an Organism.
8. Maintenance.
9. Service.
10. Play and Recreation.
11. Study.
12. Worship.

The second part, using the same units of study, deals with all ten churches, showing through comparison and parallel studies, the varying problems which each is forced to face as a result of the type of community in which it is located, its background of tradition and culture, and the financial status of its constituency. In this section, handicaps imposed by inadequate church plants, uninterested adults, adults whose thinking in religious education is warped by traditional view-points, and by an untrained leadership are pointed out, together with the ways in which the churches are attempting to overcome them.

Part three discusses the school at work. Here the reader is given

an opportunity, under the guidance of the author, to go through the sessions of the schools, evaluate their service activities, their provision for play and recreation, and their curricula, and to observe with friendly but discerning eyes, the efficacy of their worship services.

In the final chapter a summary of the problems and limitations of the ten schools is made in a lucid and adequate manner. The appendix gives in detail the forms used in the study.

This volume should prove valuable to professional and amateur workers in religious education as case material for the study of religious education as it is being carried on by progressively-minded churches. Any religious educator reading the book will want to look more deeply into his own teaching and the teaching work of his church. He will find the forms given in the appendix a veritable gold mine of information and suggestion. The book should also prove valuable as a source of case material for religious education in seminaries and other professional schools. It offers an opportunity for teachers to illustrate through specific examples what is necessary if theory is to be translated into practice in an actual church situation.

JOHN W. THOMAS.

The Trail of Life in the Middle Years. RUFUS M. JONES, LL. D., S. T. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. 250. $2.00.

FEW men have been more helpful to their contemporaries than the author of this volume. He has been a searcher for origins in that religious movement known as the Society of Friends, and by his industry, sympathetic interpretation, and felicity and simplicity of diction, has disclosed its power in modern Christianity. He has been from early manhood the witness of a power within that shapes individual and social life.

He began to tell the story in the first of his autobiographical books, *Finding the Trail of Life,* which has been almost a classic in literature for youth, and continued it in *The Trail of Life in College,* a book equally appealing to young men and women in college and university. Whoever has read those will inevitably read the one revealing experience of middle life. With modesty and freshness he tells an amazing story of exploration, industry in research, painstaking care in literary composition, and thousands of miles of travel as lecturer and teacher. He tells of his "call" to do a specific type of service to his generation, and of his "call" to adequate preparation. How well he has executed his mission all his earlier books attest; how thoroughly he fitted himself he narrates in the present volume. Professor Jones is an evangelist comparable to Moody in purpose and in expenditure of physical energy, and more enduring in his

interpretation of Christian life and thought. He is a philosopher, appropriating the best from Plato to Josiah Royce; thoroughly familiar with the results of scientific achievement in individual and social psychology, and therefore a guide that evokes confidence as he walks the trail of youth, early manhood and the middle years.

To read this volume is to trace the tragic years of hostility to evolution and biblical criticism, and to learn how one young man resolved to give himself to interpretation of Christian experience to a perplexed and eagerly expectant generation. The book is a challenge to industry, to wide reading, to reflective thinking, to consecration to highest of all purposes, namely, intelligent interpretation of the reality of possibility of Christ's place in the life of a man today.

MILTON G. EVANS.

Christian Missions and a New World Culture. ARCHIBALD G. BAKER, Professor of Missions, University of Chicago. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company. 1934. Pp. xiii, 322. $2.00.

PROFESSOR BAKER has written a book on Christian missions that is new and different. He has examined the enterprise from the standpoint of the student of psychology and social science. He has interpreted it in relation to nationalism, commerce, education and other elements of culture. The missionary enterprise is primarily a religious movement, and religion can only be understood as a phase of cultural development. It represents accumulated human experience with reference to the values of life growing out of our relations with the great fundamental realities. This being the case, we have the author's justification for an approach to the study of missions from the point of view of a great cultural movement. That involves an examination of cultural transfusion, and of the bearing of culture on personality, both through disintegration and reintegration.

In the past the missionary enterprise interpreted salvation individualistically. Now we are realizing that such a thing as an isolated individual either in America or in the Orient does not exist. Formerly missions were interpreted mostly as "giving"; now we realize that there is both give and take, and the gospel is reinterpreted over and over again in the process. "Properly interpreted, it is not a bit of western imperialism nor of Christian impudence, but a cooperative effort for human good, on a world-wide scale." One thing might be remarked, namely that the distinction between home and foreign should be banished. The world mission of the Christian church should be considered as a unity, with just as much reference to politics in New York and industry in Chicago

as preaching in Shanghai or Madras. The volume before us is concerned rather with missions in the traditional sense as an enterprise among foreign peoples.

We gratefully acknowledge the work of Professor Baker in giving us this new approach to the interpretation of missions. It ought to be particularly valuable in such scientific study as is attempted in seminaries and universities.

A. Stewart Woodburne.

Protestant Home Missions to Catholic Immigrants. Theodore F. Abel. New York: Institute of Social and Religious Research. 1933. Pp. xi, 143. $1.00.

It is an ambitious task to which this author has addressed himself when he attempts to appraise the activity and achievement of foreign-language missionary work in America. Yet it was a task that needed to be done in order to evaluate the past and rethink the future. There has been a long felt need for a dependable study of this missionary enterprise which would embrace the purpose and program of the various denominations and nationalities engaged in the cause. Those deeply interested in the movement welcomed this book in the hope of finding in it a fair record of past achievements, a frank discussion of present problems and a fearless facing of the promises of the future.

The opening pages betray the fact that the thesis of this book is based upon at least two false assumptions which naturally vitiate any conclusions that might be drawn from the study. The first is that the ultimate aim of missionary work among the newer immigrants is merely "to extend the realm of Protestantism" (p. 3), and "to maintain the dominant position of the Protestant church in American civilization" (p. 9). The second is that "the mission work among immigrants can be viewed as a social experiment . . . in Americanizing immigrants" (p. 6). Proselyting is the concealed aim of the work (p. 9), while evangelization is confessedly only a means to Americanization (p. 4).

The statements of secretaries and certain ministers to the contrary notwithstanding, this constitutes a sorry misreading of the fundamental motive which inspired and impelled missionary work among immigrants in this country. Practically all studies of immigrants reveal the fact that the bulk of this portion of our population—as even the native portion—consists neither of Protestants nor Catholics but of that larger majority designated as "unchurched." Immigrant missionary work more than any other type aims to reach this very part of the population. The methods used, street-meetings, gospel tents, house-to-house calling, etc., seek to take the Christian message to those very groups not touched by church

activities. Or, to put it more simply, it is having the church go to those who do not go to church. Furthermore, the effort merely to protestantize people does not have a motive adequately dynamic to sustain such a wide-spread movement for decades. Missionaries among immigrants are impelled by something deeper, something more universal in its appeal, something more persuasive in its power. The fundamental motive of the missionary movement among immigrants, as I have experienced its impulse and have verified its influence in the lives of many other foreign-language pastors of other languages and denominations, is simply this: to bring our fellow nationals into a vital experience with God through faith in Jesus Christ; and to educate those who are so vitalized that their daily living should be prompted by the spirit of Christ both in private life and in social relations. Perhaps we would not all use exactly the same terms, but their meaning would be essentially identical. Now, proselyting does not achieve these results in spite of the fact that it may lead to a change in church affiliation. A more profound change must take place, either immediately or gradually: conversion. It does not necessarily involve a change in church-membership though it usually does; it does result in a change of character. Obviously, such results are very difficult to tabulate in the form of statistics. No, it is not the purpose of foreign-language pastors to build up and maintain a Protestant ecclesiastical order as an end in itself. Rather, our purpose is to extend the influence of Jesus Christ in individuals and society by means of Protestant organization and method.

On the second point it can be said that it is also a grave error on the part of the author to charge the mission enterprise with the "identification of Americanization with evangelization" (p. 5). It is true that mission churches, after having established a Christian contact with the people, were ready to help them to a better understanding and practice of American ways of living. Mission churches sought first of all to evangelize immigrants, that is to bring about a spiritual transformation; then they aimed to Americanize them, that is to produce a social readjustment. It was assumed, and rightly so, that the former was a natural prerequisite to the latter. It is a confusing mistake, therefore, to make the two synonymous as the author does. In fact he goes beyond this by subordinating Americanization to evangelization when he contends that mission churches considered "evangelization as the most adequate method of Americanization" (p. 4). Evangelization has been the primary motive of Protestant missions while Americanization was the natural corollary, a secondary aim.

I can make the position of the mission churches clearer by quoting

a statement which I made at a meeting of leaders and ministers in foreign-language work including representatives of several denominations and nationalities. The statement was heartily approved by every one present. It read as follows: "Much of the work carried on by Americans among foreign-speaking peoples is based upon the tacit assumption that making these folks American is an adequate and worthy goal. Many of us who are engaged in this work seriously question this assumption. We believe that the only worthy and adequate purpose of our work with aliens is to inspire and educate them to the Christian way of life. As a foreign-speaking pastor I consider it my main business not to make these people American, but to help them become Christian. That because I am not always sure that good Americans will make true Christians, but I am certain that good Christians will always make worthy Americans."

It is to be expected that, since the author has failed to grasp the fundamental motive underlying this mission enterprise, his subsequent discussion will be liable to frequent error. In general the description of how this mission work is begun, organized and carried on is fairly correct. Most of the author's difficulties issue from his attempt to estimate and evaluate the results of the work. His criterion is hopelessly inadequate to measure the actual achievements. His judgment of real results, in line with the narrowly conceived purpose of the enterprise, is based upon "the number of Catholic immigrants in the present membership of American Protestant mission churches" (p. 34). Of course, with such a rigid and circumscribed unit of measurement, anyone with any knowledge of the work could have predicted the apparent "insignificance of the accomplishment" (p. 34). The author would have been fairer if he had compared the number of converts to the total of contacts rather than to the sum total of the Catholic population, millions of whom were never even touched by the mission churches. Even full present membership in this perspective would not give a complete picture. One needs only to recall the unusual mobility of the membership. For example, a few Hungarian Baptist churches suffered losses in membership often over fifty per cent. when members returned to their homeland after the war! More than one Mexican Baptist church has sustained even higher percentages of loss in membership by recent rulings which have forced many Mexicans to return to Mexico. Finally, complete results of this work cannot be gathered up in a mere table of membership statistics. Achievements of the mission churches must be measured on the basis of the same comprehensive criteria used for judging the effectiveness of Christian settlement work as those mentioned on pages 77 and 78. In order to evaluate properly the influence of this missionary movement one must

think of the lives of countless children, young people and adults touched, transformed, ennobled, reclaimed by the power of the Christian message preached and practiced by the missionaries.

In treating the difficulties encountered in this field of missionary endeavor, the author betrays a lack of sympathetic insight into the peculiar problems of foreign-language work. His treatment is objective, too much so, because its view-point is obviously that of one "outside" of the movement. This study must be supplemented with another by one who has done more than "make a survey"; it must be "fulfilled" by someone who has invested a life-long interest and endeavor in the movement. The difficulties caused by differences in language, by the clashes of culture, by variations in tradition and temper, etc., can be appreciated only by those who have actually wrestled with the problems which issued from them.

There are many points at which the author's discussion is open to serious question. Among them these seem most susceptible to criticism: the method employed in computing the accomplishments of formal church work (pp. 33, 34); the analysis of church membership (pp. 36-39); the treatment of conversion (pp. 40-42); the separatistic nature of the mission church (pp. 46-48); certain conclusions (pp. 53-57); the social program is treated rather fairly (pp. 58-72); but the estimate of its results are not (pp. 73-81); discussion of leadership and organization is fair but very inadequate and superficial (pp. 82-102); conclusions (pp. 103-107), are neither convincing nor conclusive because based on false premises. Hardly two pages are devoted to indicating the future of the work (pp. 105-107). The contention that many of the mission churches have outlived their usefulness is surely open to argument. Perhaps the most unfortunate fact is that some mission secretaries have long since anticipated some of the author's conclusions!

The closing chapter which contains the biography of an immigrant minister may or may not be "typical." That depends upon many facts among them the man himself with his background, training and method; the denomination, its principles and policies; the community, its obstacles and resources; the race and temper of the people to whom he ministers. These factors are all of them so highly variable that it is exceedingly difficult to generalize and be fair at the same time.

The mission work among immigrants can be understood best when studied in the setting of its American religious milieu. Its virtues and weaknesses reflect the nature of the institutions which mothered it!

EMIL KONTZ,

CHICAGO,

BOOK NOTICES

Suffering. Alphonse Daudet. Translated from the French by Milton Garver, with Commentary and Notes by André Ebner. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1934. Pp. 89. $2.00.

Alphonse Daudet, the French novelist, died in 1897 after a ten-year period of increasing suffering. In 1930 there was discovered that amazing document which Professor Garver of the French Department, Yale University, has translated into English. It consists of terse sentences, disclosing remarkable intuition and fortitude, and often expressed in epigrammatic style. Daudet learned not only to suffer patiently but to endure heroically and to conceal his pain from others lest he cause them to suffer. No words could describe his torture. "It would require screams," he tells us. "Since I know it will last forever. . . I have resigned myself, and, from time to time, I write these notes with the tip of a nail and drops of my blood on the walls of the *carcere duro*."

This is an intensely spiritual document. It discloses the soul of a man who suffered so much that suffering filled his whole horizon. Yet he reached the place, three years before his death, that he decided to talk about it no more, but to spend his remaining days scattering the seeds of happiness. It is no wonder that he wrote: "I had a vision of Jesus on the cross, in the morning on Golgotha. Humanity. Outcries."

Life's Beginnings. Compiled by F. J. N. and C. D. M. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1934. Pp. 376.

This is a book of readings arranged for daily use in private meditation and worship. There is a Scripture verse for each day, followed by quotations of poetry and prose, arranged topically. The arrangement is good, and the book ought to prove of inspirational value.

The New Interpretation of the Mass. Rev. Henry Borgmann. Baltimore: John Murphy Company. 1933. Pp. vii, 258. $2.00.

For the Protestant who would understand the Roman Catholic interpretation of the Mass probably nothing is more valuable than the article on the subject in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. The present volume is intended rather for the Catholic priest, being an attempt to interpret the Mass through the aid of a *metro*. Metrology is the method of interpreting by the aid of units and numbers. It is employed by Father Borgmann to unravel the mysteries of the liturgy. Probably the average reader, however, would find the mysteries more tangled than ever, if he attempted to understand this metrological approach.

The Shadow of the Broad Brim: The Life-Story of Charles Haddon Spurgeon. Richard Ellsworth Day. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1934. Pp. 236. $1.50.

On June 19, 1934, a century will have passed since Charles Haddon Spurgeon first saw the light of day. Although the great preacher died more than forty years ago,

Doctor Day is well within bounds in saying that "Spurgeon's life will have untold value to our contemporary world."

A biography which is to mark the centennial of the birth of such a spiritual giant demands authorship of no mean ability. The one who undertakes to trace the trail of such a life must have critical insight, sympathetic understanding, and literary skill. The present volume bears the marks of such authorship. The inexhaustible mine of source material has been made to yield its richest treasures for the delight and blessing of the readers. The facts are fairly treated, no attempt being made to fabricate a faultless saint. The soul of Spurgeon is uncovered and his very heart revealed in its simplicity, trustfulness and devotion to the one whom he had undertaken to follow as Lord. His biographer surrenders to the spell of his power. "Had I not already been a Christian," he says, "his life would have broken me and I should be ending this study on my knees, sobbing out 'My Lord and My God.'"

This is no book upon which to try to read yourself to sleep, either physically or spiritually. It shows Mr. Spurgeon to have lived and wrought under the shadow of the broad brim of his Puritan forbears, and seeks earnestly to extend that quieting shade over the heated life of the present day.

Tales from the Old Testament. H. W. Fox. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1934. Pp. 154. $1.00.

THE writer recounts familiar stories in a way that will interest and attract children. The first part contains ten tales told in Egypt by a Hebrew grandfather to his grandson and granddaughter. The experiences of Joseph and the other patriarchs are covered, as well as the traditions concerning the creation, the origin of evil, and the flood. The second part recounts stories told in Bethlehem, mostly to David by his father or mother. The history is taken up where the first part leaves it and brought down to David's time. The book is written from the modern point of view and shows the author to be a competent student of the Bible and of children.

The Christian Internationale: A Study of a World Community of the Immediate Future. Edited by RAYMOND P. CURRIER. Published by the Committee on Missions in the World of Tomorrow, 347 Madison Avenue, New York. Pp. 88. 30 cents.

The Christian Internationale is a student discussion outline, presenting the idea of a Christianity which is growing to meet the needs of our modern society. It does not claim to be more than an outline, but as such it should be provocative of further study. It presents briefly the solutions of secular groups to our problems and accents the idea that Christianity must unite to face both the problems and the other solutions. It is, of course, one-sided, in that it does not present more than one point of view, with great favor. But it should be valuable to students who care to use it, because it demonstrates the fact that men who are thinking abreast of the times are also maintaining the high faith and idealism of Christ, a reconciliation which many of our young people would like to make and find very difficult. As a single work to read, *The Christian Internationale* has a tendency to be too piece-meal, but as the basis of a course of study, which it is intended to be, it should prove a real challenge to young Christians who are trying to think.

The New Vacation Church School. W. Dyer Blair. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1934. Pp. xiv, 288. $1.50.

As director of Week-Day and Vacation Church Schools of the Greater New York Federation of Churches, Mr. Blair is in a position to write upon this subject authoritatively. The book is devoted to vacation church school organization, and improved methods of administration. It is simply written, and clarified by the use of illustrations taken from actual experiences of both teachers and pupils. Every minister, as well as those who are to be engaged in vacation school work during the summer months, ought to have access to this volume. It is a new approach to religious education for the vacation church school and will open up new vistas of thought for all who read its pages.

The Church of Today—and Tomorrow. Austen Kennedy de Blois. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1934. Pp. 292. $1.25.

The volume, written in Doctor de Blois' excellent style, is a part of the "Live It Through" campaign of Northern Baptists. Its content therefore is evaluative and inspirational, aiming to magnify the churches and their ministry in the heart of the reader. The twelve chapters are so many preachments concerning various phases of the church life and work rather than studies thereof. The reviewer cannot help wishing there was absent the conscious attempt to say nothing which could possibly give offense, an aim perchance consonant with live-it-through rather than think-it-through.

The Chances of Surviving Death. William Pepperell Montague. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1934. Pp. 98. $1.00.

This little monograph comprises the annual lecture for 1932 on "The Immortality of Man," delivered under the Ingersoll foundation at Harvard University. Professor Montague approaches his discussion with an examination of the arguments for the self as attribute or adjective of the body and as existentially substantive. Weighing the available evidence from various sciences, he lends his support to the view that the mind has aspects distinct from the properties of bodies. He even makes a plea that the concept of soul, which metaphysics and psychology have both regarded with questioning, be given a new trial. His appeal is that the soul and its states be considered as forms of energy related physically and quantitatively to the atoms and their motion. He further suggests that moral qualities in a psychic field are irreducible to material motions and quite likely to survive. The chance of survival then rests on mental and moral aspects which argue for a soul that does not cease to live when the bodily functions are terminated. There is something about personality that calls for completion or fulfilment in union with the larger life beyond.

Jesus Said "I Am." George Stewart. New York: Harper & Brothers. Pp. 89. $1.00.

This little book of sermons based upon the texts in which we find Jesus saying "I am" is a peculiarly fine collection. Here one will find sermon-making that is based upon a sense of industry and refinement. History, biography, poetry, human

experience of every description is lavishly brought to bear upon the words of Jesus so that they might live again for us. And they do. They are fine examples of the disciplined student's mind, and will prove good reading for both ministers and laity.

Left-Handed Folks. WILLIAM S. ABERNETHY. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1933. Pp. xiv and 182. $1.00.

THIS book by Doctor Abernethy is a collection of sermons somewhat abbreviated in form. Perhaps they are sermons which he has preached and then boiled them down into simpler and more direct form. They make good reading. Some of them are almost story-like in their manner and material. The dog story in "Frozen Assets" is good, and represents a certain whimsical element with which Doctor Abernethy's congregations are familiar. There are some unusual texts and themes in the collection and all of them are managed in a fine way with an excellent spirit.

For Times Out of Joint. CHARLES LYON SEASHOLES. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1934. Pp. xii and 174. $1.00.

THE collection of sermons found in this volume is by one of our younger Baptist ministers and deals naturally with many of our profounder problems of living today. There is clarity and conviction in all of them. Evidently they are shortened to suit publication, but they still have the "meat" of the matter in them; and make searching reading.

His Last Thursday. JAMES S. KIRTLEY. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1934. Pp. vi and 179. $1.00.

FOR those who want a continuous record of the happenings of the Passion period, this little volume will meet their need. Each day and its happenings are chronologically and clearly stated, and with each happening are explanations and inspirations well worth going over. It has a definite tone of conservatism and invokes few if any critical problems. Many pastors and teachers of Sunday school classes might profit by its reading, especially during the Lenten season. This is not a set of sermons, but a historical elaboration of the last days of Jesus.

BOOKS RECEIVED

HOUSE BEAUTIFUL. Isla May Mullins. Nashville, Tenn.: The Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention. 1934. Pp. 72. Cloth, 50 cents; paper, 35 cents.

THE APOSTOLIC TRADITION OF HIPPOLYTUS. Translated by Burton Scott Easton. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. ix, 112. $2.25.

THE UNKNOWN GOD. Alfred Noyes. New York: Sheed and Ward. 1934. Pp. 383. $2.50.

CHRIST'S MEMORIAL. M. E. Dodd. Nashville, Tenn.: Baptist Sunday School Board. 1934. Pp. 102. $1.25.

THE RETURN OF SPRING TO MAN'S SOUL. Ivan Lee Holt. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1934. Pp. 119. $1.00.

CODEX 2400 AND ITS MINIATURES. Reprinted from the Art Bulletin, Vol. xv, No. 1. Harold R. Willoughby. Chicago, Ill.: The College Art Association of America. 1933. Pp. 74.

LET'S BUILD A NEW WORLD. Burvis Jenkins. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1934. Pp. 96. $1.00.

CAN I KNOW GOD? Frederick B. Fisher. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1934. Pp. 140. $1.00.

PORPHYRY'S WORK AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS: AN INTERPRETATION. Amos Berry Hules. New Haven, Conn.: The Author. 1934. Pp. 56.

SAILS AND ANCHORS. Harold Cooke Phillips. Philadelphia, Pa.: The Judson Press. 1934. Pp. 180. $1.00.

THE KINGDOM WITHIN. Charles T. Webb. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. xix, 230. $2.00.